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In this era of globalisation and technology flows, the nuclear field 
continues to retain strong barriers to international collaboration. From 
nuclear energy to non-proliferation however, the potential for concerted 
action exists. The International and Strategic Studies Unit of the National 
Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) held a two day Seminar on November 
21-22, 1996 exploring the challenges and prospects for achieving mutual 
cooperation between states relating to all aspects of nuclear technology. This 
volume is based on the proceedings of the Seminar.
The Seminar was attended by senior experts from the U.S., France, 
South Korea, Japan, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency. A 
major purpose of the Seminar was to approach the question of nuclear 
cooperation in a novel fashion by bringing international and security affairs 
analysts together with specialists in the areas of nuclear technology, 
monitoring and verification, and nuclear power. This unique gathering of 
scientists, technologists and defence experts was to allow consideration of 
both technical and political angles of nuclear cooperation. Such an approach 
is particularly compatible with the underlying philosophy of NIAS which is 
rooted in the multidisciplinary method of problem solving.
The broad themes that the Seminar considered included disarmament 
and the security link; implementation and verification of nonproliferation 
regimes; transfer of technology and nuclear energy. The Seminar culminated 
with a round table on confidence building. An important point of departure 
for the proceedings was the Indo-U.S. relationship and the need to place it on 
a stable course in the nuclear arena.
Explaining Indo-U.S. Relations
The episode of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) running 
through most of 1996, strained ties between India and the U.S. and had 
threatened to raise tensions to a new level. This was of course in stark 
contrast to the burgeoning links between the two countries underway since 
India’s economic liberalisation experiment was launched in 1991. Despite 
their strategic relations not having taken off as was initially expected given 
the historically favorable conjunction of economic liberalisation and the end 
of the cold war, there seemed to be a period of low key and tacit acceptance 
of the complex relationship, which then came under severe tests with the 
unconditional indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 
May 1995, the Hank Brown amendment and the tortuous CTBT negotiations.
Despite India’s stand at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva 
and the CTBT outcome, India’s relations with the U.S. or any of the other
vc
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countries for that matter seem to have not been appreciably affected, at least 
at the official level. This suggests that these relations are on fairly sound 
footing. Indeed, some evidence that a new sense of “realism” has begun to 
inform American thinking is found in the just released Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) report on U.S. policy towards India and Pakistan. The 
report calls for a fundamental change in U.S. approach towards this area and 
to “explore the formation of a real strategic partnership” with India. In the 
authors’ view India has the potential to become a major power, with its 
strength contributing to stability across Asia.
On the nuclear question, the report points to the nuclear self restraint 
of India and Pakistan and urges the U.S. to “stop pressing for the Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear programmes to be rolled back completely, an outcome 
which is simply not in the cards for the foreseeable future.” The authors go 
further and call for a change in the punitive approach and suggest lifting of 
existing embargoes on technology transfer, assisting India’s civilian nuclear 
programme, and deepening military cooperation. What the prestigious 
CFR’s report indicates is the lack of a monolithic perspective on India among 
U.S. policy experts and the possibility of a renewed Indo-U.S. dialogue 
encompassing even the nuclear field. For this to become a reality however, 
thinking on nuclear cooperation will have to be lifted to a different level.
Nuclear Paradigms
Recently, there have been suggestions that thinking on nuclear issues 
has come under increasing pressure in both India and the U.S., partly as a 
result of changed international circumstances and partly as a result of 
internal debates. While continuing its historical commitment to universal 
and nondiscriminatory disarmament, during the CTBT debate, the Indian 
government signalled that its own security consideration may become more 
prominent. In this reassessment, the persisting reluctance of nuclear 
weapons states to forgo their arsenal, and the nuclearisation of the region 
have been cited. Ultimately, policy will have to reflect India’s security 
threats and strategic priorities.
According to some American experts, the U.S. nuclear paradigm is 
showing some cracks from its earlier consistent doctrine of deterrence. They 
argue that important voices in the United States are increasingly getting 
converted to the idea of the abolition of nuclear weapons. The “Generals” 
statement released in December 1996 by a large group of former senior 
military officials in the U.S., Russia and elsewhere, calling for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons, is seen as a case in point. One view is that 
this group (which included individuals who have been in charge of their 
country s nuclear arsenal at one time or other) is part of a larger movement
x
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in the U.S. seriously committed to abolition.
Of course, it remains to be seen how far this perspective can be 
sustained and to what extent it will influence U.S. and other nuclear weapon 
states’ actual policy. The present official U.S. doctrine is solidly based on 
deterrence and nuclear weapons are viewed as useful among other reasons to 
deter use of chemical and biological weapons by so called rogue states, and 
to counter any nuclear armed regional power. In addition, given the vast 
U.S. superiority in conventional weapons as a result of its mastery of the so 
called the military technical revolution, there may be others among the 
nuclear weapon states who will resist giving up their nuclear advantage.
Dialogue at this level is not easy as conflicting “perceptions” among 
the participants of the Seminar demonstrated. But an important question is 
whether it is a matter of conflict of interest or conflict of perceptions, and for 
this to be explored, even more intensive dialogue is required.
Prospects
This Seminar was conceived in part with the assumption that while 
nuclear politics may continue to divide at least in the near future, technical 
cooperation in the nuclear area is still desirable and would be useful in 
moving relationships forward. With some imagination and will, this should 
not be an impossible task. Continuing embargoes and sanctions against India 
in nuclear trade will go against not only India’s, but also the international 
community’s energy, security and environmental interests. For example, 
India’s nuclear capacity will no doubt have to be increased to meet its 
inevitably huge electric power needs in the near future to avoid the heavy 
utilisation of environmentally degrading fossil fuels. Environment and 
energy security are of course world class, and the problems in the power 
sector should be usefully delinked from proliferation problems. The U.S. 
responsiveness on this will be important for other countries’ position 
vis-a-vis India and for joint bilateral or multilateral activities in this area.
Denial of leading edge technologies under dual use embargoes are 
unlikely to be successful in the long run against technically resilient states 
like India. Rather, it would be useful to look at this issue from a point of 
view of utilising technology to improve the quality of life in developing 
countries. Rethinking of existing embargoes need not be out of the question 
since the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group operates only under “guidelines,” and 
even the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act is open to reinterpretation. From 
India’s perspective, there continues to be little, if any, acknowledgement of 
its self imposed restraint in the nuclear area, ranging from the question of 
deployment of weapons to export of sensitive material. A reassessment may 
be particularly timely in the current system of global interdependence in
x i
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which India is increasingly getting linked through its economic and 
technological liberalisation.
From the perspective of the outcome of the Seminar, the next stage 
will be to identify interim steps and measures India and the U.S. could jointly 
pursue in the nuclear field and launch active work on them through 
nongovernmental agencies and unofficial channels. In the process, it is 
hoped that policymaking will be assisted positively in both countries.
We are indebted to the distinguished participants for sparing time 
from their extremely busy schedules to attend the Seminar and prepare 
papers as requested. Without their intensive and high quality effort, along 
with their willingness to engage in frank discussions on admittedly difficult 
topics, the Seminar could not have been a success. In translating the Seminar 
from an idea to reality, Dr. Raja Ramanna’s vision, leadership, and 
encouragement were invaluable. In this connection, the keen interest and 
contributions of Dr. Thomas Graham from the Rockefeller Foundation, were 
indispensable, and we acknowledge the Foundation's assistance. We must 
also mention Dr. V.S. Arunachalam who has provided continuing support for 
the Unit.
Arvind Kumar, Research Associate in the Unit was tireless in taking 
care of many of the details of the Seminar as well as in preparing this 
volume. We must also thank the members of the NIAS staff who spared no 
effort in making sure that the Seminar proceeded smoothly, especially 
Gayathri Lokhande who provided outstanding secretarial assistance for the 





RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
Raja Ramanna
Good morning to all of you, ladies and gentlemen. I am supposed to 
be the first speaker to talk about “Recent Developments: An Indian 
Perspective.” My first duty is to welcome all of you, and express our 
appreciation that you are all able to be here for this discussion which we 
presume will have some impact on thinking in the world. I make a special 
reference to Thomas Graham of the Rockefeller Foundation because this 
meeting is held on the basis of a joint programme. I also express my thanks 
for the cooperation I received from my Indian friends.
One word about the passing of this century. It is a remarkable one, 
but I must say also a very unhappy one. From the scientific angle, the 
discoveries and progress that have been made are fantastic, but for those of 
us who have witnessed the great part of the century, it is with great sadness 
we see the use of modem technology and the world wars.
I would like to quickly summarise what makes India interested in 
nuclear energy and the consequent problem that it has, perhaps from an 
angle which may be different from other countries. But the very purpose of 
this Seminar is to expose these differences and see where we can find a 
common understanding so that it does not lead to unnecessary recrimination 
and unnecessary suspicion. One point to note is that the government for a 
long time has been convinced of the benefits of nuclear energy as a source of 
power. Unfortunately, our nuclear programme is going slower than before 
for various reasons which I am sure my colleagues will explain, but in this 
city of Bangalore itself, the state of power, and the number of cuts we get is 
a sign of how much we are suffering for want of a simple thing like power.
Once we use something like nuclear energy, we must also take note 
of other countries which are also engaged in similar activity. We have to 
protect and have some special considerations for national security and 
national sovereignty, especially in a situation of scarce resources. Now I 
have jumped from the necessity of nuclear energy or energy in general, to 
national security and national sovereignty because India is a country which 
has been during various periods of our history, dominated by some other 
power, which did not necessarily have a special attraction for our ways of 
living, our ways of thinking and this js something to be taken into account. 
We just cannot erase our cultural tendencies which go back to more than 
3000 years. And that culture continues to be with us with its good points and 
its bad points and therefore, we are rather sensitive to national sovereignty 
and national security.
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But how do we get over all these problems and I think I would like 
to go to my next part just by mentioning that we have a unique gathering of 
scientists and those interested in political affairs. Therefore, this gathering 
should be able to face the problems squarely and I request all of you to be as 
frank as possible. Our main problem is delinking: yes we need power, but 
nuclear energy is so connected with economics, safety, public opinion, 
political issues, and for all these, the base should be technical solutions. We 
have tried to be slightly different from other conferences and to give a 
technical bias to our meeting and therefore, I am grateful to the people who 
have given technical papers so that the solution which we are looking for, 
may lie simply with good technical approaches and reduce the political 
pressures that has been with us ever since 1945. In other words, I am saying 
treaties are necessary for taking certain actions, but they are not an end in 
themselves and therefore, the removal of suspicion, distrust should be looked 
at from a technological point of view as well.
I begin with the problem of resources itself which Dr. Chidambaram 
and the colleagues here from Atomic Energy will perhaps give us the latest 
information on. One thing we all agree is that we have so much thorium and 
if you are thinking not of the next century, but the century even after that, 
the conversion of thorium into fuel and the use of recycling of plutonium 
becomes essential, and in a sense we consider that the destruction of 
plutonium in a power reactor is a better way of getting rid of the material 
after having extracted all the energy that it contains. Be that as it may, we 
are told that essentially the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are the way to make progress. This 
also includes the 93+2 proposal and we are grateful to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency for having sent a senior representative. These alone 
however are not a sufficient basis to go forward. Now, a certain amount of 
lateral thinking has to be done regarding the need for power, need for fuel, 
and the distribution of power which should be a common commodity all 
over the world in the next century.
What is happening now is not the example nor is it a happy situation 
because a lot of time is being spent on the technology of introducing 
embargoes. For the countries which have scarce material, that sounds more 
like punishment for no crime committed. But in the end, it is the people who 
suffer hardships as we are suffering through shortages now. And the 
moment people have hardship, internal acrimony will start with blame being 
put on others, which includes outsiders too. As a result, many 
misconceptions begin to arise. As I said, I do not want to speak too much on 
these issues but on embargoes I think Dr. Chidambaram is going to speak 
and I leave it to him. However, I saw something in today’s newspaper
2
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which we supported a long time ago, and which we thought could prevent 
the misuse of atomic energy i.e. an agreement of no first use. We have 
agreed to “no first use” and I believe we can go down this path. If promises 
to the world mean anything, and someone says they will not use nuclear 
weapons first, then there can never be a beginning. Now, the whole problem 
comes down to the fact that there will always be “rogue countries,” to use a 
common phrase. This is where the technical aspect comes in because 
whereas “no first use” sounds fine, we have to be able to detect unwelcome 
changes which might be brought on by some unexpected events.
This is a country of nearly a billion people, and democratic methods 
have to be used in convincing them regarding what is good. We have to 
compare this with the size of Europe itself. Many times, people say South 
Asia or Southeast Asia have very complex problems, and that India as a 
“country of countries” is a very difficult one for people to understand, even 
for the people who live here. And therefore, a country attempting democracy 
in these circumstances will always be criticised for the democracy that it 
does has.
It is not that people here want the weapon aspects of nuclear 
technology. Weapons of mass destruction are most unpleasant, but there is 
the question of bullying someone whether by saying “you do not do it” or 
by saying “we will look after you.” There is an issue of being able to trust 
someone that is a part of the history of the world wars and part of our 
ancient battles here as well. For example on the question of no testing which 
came up during the CTBT, who can question India which has not tested since 
1974 without signing any treaty. I agree that though we call 1974 a peaceful 
nuclear explosion, you cannot make a distinction between these things. It 
was an underground explosion first of its type. So I am sure that this country 
when it has not tested for more than 20 years, suddenly, it will not become 
interested in testing, unless there is a problem of security, unless new 
developments have arisen with respect to the political situation.
Because we are a new democracy, we do not like people being 
treated separately, one from the other. Yes, we agree that there could be 
rogue countries and non rogue countries if globally all countries are in 
agreement. But we cannot accept that five countries or six countries or a 
few others are highly intellectual and better than all of us, morally or 
mentally. This is the thing which used to worry us in the 1930s and the 
1920s and something that used to demoralise us in the last century, if we 
look at the writings of that period. We would like to get rid of that. I am 
very glad that the IAEA is represented here. Perhaps, we have to look 
forward to some international organisation to remove suspicions.
I would like to end by saying that in the various presentations to
3
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come, we must have frank discussion at every point. Mine is essentially in 
the form of welcoming remarks and recent developments in the Indian 
perspective. I think people in charge in government like Dr. Chidambaram 
will say how important it is to increase our energy output from nuclear 
energy. Therefore, one would like to have assistance of getting on with the 
job quickly. I am sorry, but this is where I am very critical of the IAEA 
quietly sitting by while lists like the London Club list is made and the 
Zangger Committee is formed. They used to get a kick out of it by 
increasing the list without seeing the consequences in international trade and 
to other countries trying to develop. It helped us to a certain extent that a 
degree of self reliance came about, but we are such a big country that we 
could do it, but I think it harmed much smaller countries.
I do not know if it has helped in politics. Some of our industries rose 
to the occasion and could produce the required material, but sometimes it 
reached such a ridiculous stage by saying such things as “you will not be 
supplied nuclear magnetic resonance equipment for your hospital because it 
is nuclear material.” I have seen that letter and that shows the arrogance 
which comes about by misinterpreting government rules (about which we 
know here). But when these things happen in the private sector, it shows a 
kind of contempt for other human beings. We would like to get rid of all 
that and our question is how do we do it. On dual use, certainly there are 
some good reasons for it, but simply signing things which other people want 
us to sign, certainly could upset the whole equilibrium of the world for the 
next century. This is a very bad situation, ladies and gentlemen, and I would 
like you to think about all these matters. That is all I have to say. I once 
again thank you for listening to me.
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This brief essay is being written to answer the question related to the 
continuing strains in Indo-U.S. relations, considered from a nongovernmental 
perspective. Many suggest that Indo-U.S. relations are strained primarily 
because of decades of nuclear controversies, the most recent of which was 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While clearly true, this answer 
also obscures more than it illuminates. A more complete answer relates to a 
series of changes in both the American foreign and military policy decision 
making systems and information gathering systems that have taken place 
after the end of the cold war. The basic problem is that the mainstream U.S. 
elite press such as the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street 
Journal, has cut back on the quality and quantity of its foreign reporting at 
the same that other information sources including cable channels like CNN 
and the Internet have proliferated. Thus, the information gaps between what 
is in the minds of generalist decisionmakers, “functional” policy experts, and 
regional specialists have grown. Since U.S. government officials are also 
moving into an electronic environment, the problem is equally true for 
people whether they work for government or nongovernmental institutions.
The difficulty to get multiple audiences to learn the same lesson has 
increased, unless some dramatic event takes place. For better or worse, in 
terms of Indo-U.S. relations, in the last year this “dramatic event” has been 
India’s blocking of the CTBT in Geneva and the nearly unanimous vote at 
the United Nations General Assembly. On the American side, this event has 
stimulated uneven learning. Some of the lessons that have been learned both 
by specialists and generalists may be wrong. Solving this problem will 
require a great deal of effort and changing some of our standard operating 
procedures.
Increasingly, in the United States, people who follow foreign affairs 
can be placed in one of three groups. While the name and composition of the 
groups differ depending on the issue being addressed, the basic structure is 
similar across issue areas. The most elite group consists of what may be 
termed as the “gate keepers” who are still (by virtue of their seniority) people 
who have spent the majority of their professional lives working on or near 
U.S.-Soviet issues and occupy most of the decisionmaking positions in 
government. In this regard, the Bush administration and the first Clinton 
administration are quite similar. For the first Clinton administration, 
Anthony Lake, (National Security Council), William Perry (Department of 
Defence), Warren Christopher (Department of State), John Deutch (Central
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Intelligence Agency), Strobe Talbott (Department of State) were people who 
could make decisions on Russia related issues almost without the aid of 
briefing papers. This was not true of many other issues.
The second level team was equally dominated by people who have 
had little knowledge about Asia, Africa, Latin America or the emerging 
issues of drugs, terrorism, or even weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
proliferation. The nongovernment sector is more diverse, but again the most 
senior experts tend to be people who have had extensive experience working 
in the executive branch, often on cold war issues. A good list of these 
experts may be found looking at the membership of the Council on Foreign 
Relations. Increasingly, these people are having to learn complex lessons 
concerning countries and issues about which they knew virtually nothing a 
few years ago.
Next comes “functional” policy specialists. These are people who 
are experts on issues such as arms control, human rights, economic policy 
and environmental policy. For any policy to be formulated and implemented 
successfully, their detailed knowledge must be understood by the gate 
keepers. While some of these experts in and out of government have 
developed significant knowledge about specific regions or countries, they 
often do not have extensive foreign language skills and have not lived 
outside the U.S. sufficiently to get a feel for non-European, OECD advanced 
industrial countries.
Finally, there are people who are traditionally characterized as “area 
studies” experts. Both in and out of government, most of these people have 
devoted their lives to learning about a particular region, and often one 
country. As mobility within government is the norm, many times regional 
experts outside of government have more knowledge of “their” region than 
do people on the foreign affairs, defence, treasury, and intelligence desks. 
However, until relatively recently, government area studies experts have had 
much more specific, time sensitive information than is available to scholars 
and nongovernment experts.
For purposes of this essay, the groups will be called the foreign and 
military policy gate keepers, arms control and nuclear specialists, and 
Southern Asia specialists. The term “Southern Asia” is not common. I use it 
here to include experts both on South Asia (traditionally defined) and China. 
I include China because in my view it is an integral part of both the security 
problem and the potential solution. However, most American experts on 
China share a traditional Chinese view that rejects such a close linkage with 
“South Asia”. An important point which needs to be taken into account is 




I will list in reverse chronological order short-hand notations for 
events that have been considered important to these different groups. The 
list is based on material that has crossed my desk in the last month and is by 
no means complete. I hope it will provide sufficient “data” so that 
participants at the conference can judge for themselves the validity, or lack of 
validity, of the propositions set out in this paper.
Foreign/Military Policy Gate Keepers
•  Hie second Clinton administration has already met with opposition to 
its proposals to deploy additional U.S. troops in Bosnia and to deploy 
troops in Central Africa.
•  The second Clinton administration will have a new foreign and 
military policy team with great uncertainty on the degree to which 
foreign affairs will be emphasized. During the last presidential debate 
which included questions from the public, the moderator asked at the 
end, “Does anybody have a foreign affairs question?”
The failure of Bob Dole to make any headway on his “realist” foreign 
policy critique on Clinton demonstrates that voters really believe the 
cold war is over.
• A bipartisan group of gate keepers attempts to define U.S. national 
interests and sustain support for international affairs leadership in the 
face of decreased public interest. The Commission of America’s 
National Interests produced a report in July 1996 which had as co­
chairs, Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser; as 
executive directors Graham Allison (Harvard), Dimitri Simes (Nixon 
Center for Peace and Freedom), and James Thomson (RAND). Other 
members included Richard Armitage, David Gergen, Geoff Kemp, 
John McCain, Condi Rice, Robert Blackwill, Bob Graham, Arnold 
Kantor, Sam Nunn and Brent Scowcroft. The commission identified 
five “blue chip” vital U.S. national interests as the following: prevent, 
reduce and deter proliferation of WMD; prevent emergence of hostile 
hegemon in Europe or Asia; prevent the emergence of a hostile major 
power on the U.S. borders or in control of the seas; prevent 
catastrophic collapse of major global trade, financial, energy or 
environmental systems; ensure survival of U.S. allies. The report says 
that complete elimination of nuclear weapons should not be ruled out, 
but thought it was not practically possible at this point in time. With 
respect to South Asia, it said that an Indo-Pakistan nuclear war would 
not necessarily threaten a vital U.S. interest.
•  A half dozen nongovernmental groups are trying to focus attention on
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the sharp reduction in funding approved by the Congress for the 150 
account which covers non-defence and non-intelligence aspects of 
U.S. foreign policy.
Arms Control and Nuclear Policy Specialists
•  The intellectual debate over abolition of WMD has become more 
serious as demonstrated by the forthcoming (December 4, 1996) 
statement by senior retired U.S. military leaders, international military 
leaders, the Canberra Commission report and other policy papers. It 
may be noted that when this author first suggested that an intellectual 
movement was growing in the U.S. to support elimination of nuclear 
weapons at a meeting at NIAS in January 1994, many Indian 
participants were polite but skeptical. There are now at least a dozen 
policy reports that focus on the issue of deep cuts or elimination. 
Within the next three months several key documents will be released 
on this topic. A description of the range of thinking primarily in the 
U.S. on the abolition issue is summarized in a paper written by this 
author which can be made available to interested participants.
•  President Clinton’s speech at the U.N. on September 24, 1996 outlined 
his six point arms control agenda. Clinton’s six points were: 
(1) Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC); (2) a fissile cutoff; (3) post 
Russian ratification of START II, continued nuclear reductions and 
limiting and monitoring nuclear warheads and materials to make deep 
reductions irreversible; (4) strengthening the NPT regime; (5) 
strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention; (6) ban on the use, 
stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel land mines.
•  Nongovernmental experts believe that severe challenges are ahead 
with respect to Russian ratification of START II, and U.S. ratification 
of the CWC and CTBT.
• The Republican platform, reports from key Republican members of 
Congress and other nongovernment policy experts reveal that a 
significant group of people oppose a zero yield CTBT and would like 
to continue to modernise the U.S. nuclear force. For example, the 
Chairman of the House National Security Committee, Floyd Spence, a 
Republican from South Carolina was extremely critical of the 
administration’s efforts to reduce emphasis on nuclear weapons.
Southern Asia Specialists
•  Japan was named over India to become the Asian non-permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council.
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•  A parliamentary debate has begun in India over the effectiveness of its 
foreign policy.
•  A sharp debate in India continues after the CTBT was approved by the 
UNGA on the desirability of India conducting another nuclear test. 
Participants include Raja Ramanna, K. Subrahmanyan), Brahma 
Chellaney, C. Raja Mohan.
•  Support in India for total elimination of nuclear weapons is often 
mentioned, but few specifics are noted, especially with respect to steps 
India is willing to take.
• A public opinion survey conducted in Pakistan concluded that a 
consensus 62 percent supported keeping the nuclear option open, 
while 32 percent favored acquisition of nuclear weapons and six 
percent renouncing nuclear weapons. Virtually all saw the threat 
coming from India.
• Some South Asia experts support the United States having India 
balance China. Other South Asia specialists believe that no support 
for a balancing role will be found either in the United States or in 
Southeast Asia,
• Foreign Minister Gujral’s July 15,1996 statement to Parliament 
included a subtle diplomatic hint that a compromise might be worked 
out on the CTBT issue: “What we are seeking is a commitment to 
engage in negotiations that will lead to the elimination of nuclear 
weapons within a time frame. Naturally, we have our own idea of 
what is a reasonable time frame but we are willing to negotiate this 
with other countries. We realize that such negotiations are not part of 
the CTBT, but we would like the CTBT to act as a catalyst for these 
negotiations. Without such a commitment reflected in the CTBT, we 
are convinced that this treaty will be an end in itself, rather than a first 
step on the road to nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the nuclear 
weapons states remain unwilling to make any meaningful commitment 
with regard to eliminating their nuclear arsenals.” The speech also 
mentioned India’s policy of unparalleled restraint for 22 years.
•  In the summer of 1996, the Council on Foreign Relations convened a 
task force of specialists to attempt to outline a new U.S. policy 
approach towards South Asia. Press reports on China’s assistance to 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes, repeated calls in 
the Indian press for nuclear weaponisation and testing, and the reduced 
quality of NGO interaction between American and Indian specialists 
all combined to keep this task force report from being completed.
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NONPROLIFERATION, DISARM AM ENT AND  
THE SECURITY LINK
C. Raja Mohan
India’s decision to block the passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and its 
vote against the Treaty at the United Nations this fall have deepened the 
nuclear divide between India and the United States--and the western powers 
in general. Although India and the United States have argued about the 
nuclear question for nearly three decades, their differences now look far 
more irreconcilable in the wake of their recent acrimony over the CTBT. 
After successful cooperation in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes during the 1950s and early 1960s, India and the United States 
began to drift apart and argue on a number of issues. These included the role 
of nuclear weapons in international security, the management of the nuclear 
weapons dynamic in India’s neighbourhood, the regulation of the global 
flows of civilian nuclear technology, the creation of a fire-break between 
civilian and military uses of nuclear technology, the question of technical 
choices for the future generation of nuclear power such as plutonium use, 
and on the priorities of global multilateral arms control. Since the 1980s, the 
differences have extended to the sphere of missile development, space 
technology and beyond to cover a broader gamut of strategic and dual use 
technologies.
A Rocky Relationship
Since the end of the cold war and the Gulf War, nonproliferation has 
become a major element of the Indo-U.S. dialogue, and tended to complicate 
the bilateral effort to build a new political relationship in the changed global 
context. For the United States, preventing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction has emerged at the top of the American foreign and national 
security policy agenda in the 1990s. The Bush administration and the 
Clinton administration sought to promote a range of diplomatic initiatives—at 
the bilateral, regional and global levels with the objective of bringing India 
into the nonproliferation net. For an India that found itself in difficult 
political and economic circumstances at the end of the cold war, defending 
its nuclear option had become an important domestic political issue. India 
ducked and dodged most of the American arms control proposals, including 
the convening of a multilateral conference to develop a regional 
nonproliferation agenda for the Indian subcontinent.
Seeking to build a broader political and economic relationship, India
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and the United States made an attempt to narrow their nuclear differences 
and find some common ground on arms control. At their Washington 
meeting in May 1994, President Bill Clinton and Indian Prime Minister P.V. 
Narasimha Rao issued a joint statement in which they appeared to find a 
formula to finesse their nuclear divergence. The United States acknowledged 
the importance of total disarmament as a long term goal. India conceded the 
necessity of discussing nonproliferation in a regional and global context. 
Clinton and Rao also pledged that their governments would intensify their 
cooperative efforts to achieve a CTBT and a verifiable ban on the production 
of fissile materials.
Barely two years later, this approach towards bridging the nuclear 
divide between India and the United States lies in shambles. At the end of 
the drafting of the CTBT, India has declared that it will not sign the treaty, 
not now, not later. And the United States has managed to get a CTBT, that 
will not come into force without India’s signature. The deepening nuclear 
divergence between India and the United States has also clouded the 
prospects for a fissile materials cut off treaty.
This paper argues that so long as India and the United States persist 
with their current normative approaches to the nuclear question, they will be 
unable to resolve their differences on nuclear weapons. The United States 
argues that nonproliferation has now become an international norm, with the 
unconditional and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the overwhelming global endorsement of the CTBT. The 
U.S. believes that South Asia today remains the principal exception to the 
global nonproliferation norm. Gaining universal adherence to the 
nonproliferation norm must be expected to be one of the major priorities of 
American foreign policy in the coming years. India on the other hand argues 
that the elimination of all mass destruction weapons must be the norm that 
the world should work for. Having agreed to eliminate biological and 
chemical weapons, now it is necessary to move in a determined fashion 
towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. If India and the United States shed 
these rigid approaches and look at nuclear weapons as part of the larger 
balance of power system in the world, they may be in a better position to find 
cooperative solutions to their nuclear dilemmas.
India: A Step Towards Realism
The prolonged and vigorous recent Indian debate on the CTBT 
revealed one new trend: an emphasis on the security dimension as opposed to 
the traditional obcession with disarmament. For nearly half a century, 
normative considerations such as equity, fairness, and nondiscrimination 
have been at the heart of Indian nuclear policy. General and complete
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disarmament has been India’s great goal. The elimination of nuclear 
weapons has been its principal objective. In an important shift during the 
CTBT debate, the officials of the Indian government and its negotiators at 
the CD have also cited national security considerations besides others in 
opposing an international arms control treaty. Pointing to the continued 
reliance on nuclear weapons by the great powers for their national security, 
and the nuclearisation of India’s neighbourhood, New Delhi, probably for the 
first time, began to signal to the world that national security considerations 
may now have become a vital element in India’s arms control 
decisionmaking.
For most countries of the world with a stake in nuclear issues, there 
was clarity about the relationship between national security and arms control. 
The latter was an extension of the former. Arms control diplomacy has 
always been an integral part of the national security policy of the traditional 
great powers of the international system. For the smaller powers or the 
defeated ones, national security through alliances has been far more 
important than fairness or equity in arms control arrangements. But for 
China and India, the two large nations with significant power potential that 
emerged at the end of the Second World War, managing the relationship 
between arms control and national security has not always been simple. 
They have been far too obscessed with independent foreign policy to 
become lesser partners in alliance systems with great powers. China found 
out that even ideological affinity would not cement its alliance with the 
Soviet Union in the 1950s. Both China and India discovered that they had 
no option but to rely on their own means for national security.
But the efforts by these emerging powers to realise their own power 
potential has often run headlong into the prevailing priorities of the arms 
control agenda established by the western powers which have dominated the 
international system. China’s search for an independent nuclear deterrent in 
the 1960s was challenged by the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), that was 
widely seen as a “collective good” for the international community. While 
the whole world supported the PTBT, China had no option but to defy it. It 
was no surprise that China condemned the PTBT as a tool of superpower 
hegemony, and pressed ahead with atmospheric nuclear explosions until it 
could go underground like the other nuclear weapon powers.
India’s own efforts to expand its strategic options had to confront a 
variety of international obstacles, including the NPT and the associated 
global nonproliferation regimes. Since the end of the cold war, the U.S. 
backed efforts to cap, reduce over a period of time, and eventually eliminate 
India’s nuclear and missile capabilities acquired a new thrust. Like China in 
the earlier period, India today has had no option but to reject this post cold
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war arms control agenda of which the CTBT is only one element.
As they struggled to protect their strategic potential from being 
denuded by the international arms control regimes, both China and India had 
to justify their defiance in terms of higher ideological principles. Just as the 
west presented its own particular interests in nonproliferation as universal 
interests, China and India too had to articulate their defence in terms of a 
broader philosophy. China put its opposition to global arms control in the 
1960s and 1970s in terms of left wing internationalism and resistance to 
superpower domination of the international order. India took recourse to 
principles of liberalism. At the bottom of it all, there was no question that 
both countries were seeking to preserve their own interests. But the 
similarity between India and China ends here.
China gate-crashed into the club of nuclear weapon powers, while 
India continues to agonize over its nuclear option. Once it became a nuclear 
weapon power, China has managed find a better balance between its national 
security interests and its disarmament diplomacy. Having gained formal 
recognition of its nuclear status, China’s troubles with international arms 
control regime began to abate. India, which has danced around the threshold 
status, is now seen as the nation with the highest proliferation risk and invites 
the full wrath of the global nonproliferation regimes. For China, 
disarmament diplomacy has become an instrument to keep the international 
focus on the continuing arms race between the other great powers, to 
publicize its own restraint, and present its own nuclear weapons in a less 
threatening way. In that sense disarmament diplomacy has become a 
scaffolding to preserve the political utility of its nuclear deterrent.
In India, on the other hand, disarmament diplomacy has become an 
end in itself. It has tended to paralyse New Delhi’s ability to take critical 
decisions on the nature and structure of its nuclear deterrent. The emphasis 
on normative principles and the focus on ethical questions that are so central 
to India’s articulation of the goal of disarmament, have become the principal 
obstacles to clear and hard-headed thinking about nuclear weapons and its 
own security. The disarmament posture, to be sure, was useful in justifying 
India’s rejection of international arms control that imposed unacceptable 
constraints on its nuclear programme. But it also has come in the way of 
taking tough decisions on its strategic programmes.
The new emphasis on national security in the Indian nuclear debate 
in the context of the CTBT has been long over due. But this new approach 
has not removed the traditional focus on disarmament. After all the absence 
of a linkage between the CTBT and a time bound framework for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons has been among the principal reasons for the 
Indian rejection of the CTBT. The broad political consensus in New Delhi
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against the CTBT was built around the traditional commitment to 
disarmament and not on the basis of an agreement on what to do with India’s 
nuclear weapon option. This dominance of the disarmament view has left 
many questions unanswered. Would India have agreed to forego the right to 
conduct a test in the future in return for an agreement by the nuclear weapon 
powers to negotiate nuclear disarmament either within or outside the CTBT 
framework? Could India have accepted a time frame of, say, 50 years, to 
eliminate nuclear weapons? What about the possibility that nuclear weapons 
will be around for a long time to come? How would India deal with the 
nuclear threats in the interim, pending their elimination? Or even more 
importantly, has a compelling case been made to suggest that India would be 
more secure in a world without nuclear weapons? Or does the case for 
nuclear abolition rest on consequentialist and deontological arguments 
alone?
United States and Nuclear Abolition
Even as a realist strain begins to assert itself in the Indian thinking 
about nuclear weapons, there is a growing body of opinion in the United 
States that is beginning to look at the abolition of nuclear weapons in a 
serious way. Many former senior defence officials and retired generals have 
begun to argue that the utility, of nuclear weapons has begun to decline. 
Many think tanks and groups in the United States are engaged in studies 
about the problems and challenges of nuclear abolition. Unlike in the past 
when the very notion of nuclear abolition was laughed out of court there is a 
strong view that the question now needs serious professional attention of the 
strategic community. At the global level the recent judgement of the 
International Court of Justice that the great powers have an obligation to 
negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons has enthused disarmament 
activities worldwide. Earlier the Canberra Commission, a group of “wise 
men” from all over the world endorsed the objective of nuclear abolition, 
although without a definitive time frame to achieve it.
Does the new interest in nuclear disarmament provide an opportunity 
for resolving the Indo-U.S. nuclear differences, and for a cooperative 
endeavour towards nuclear abolition as envisaged in the Clinton-Rao 
declaration? The optimists argue that the Clinton administration has already 
conceded the objective of nuclear abolition, as an eventual goal not only in 
the Clinton-Rao statement but also in the declaration of principles and 
objectives issued at the end of the NPT extension conference in May 1995. 
It is pointed out that the difference between nuclear abolition as an “ultimate 
goal,” accepted by the Clinton administration, and a “time-bound 
framework” demanded by India should not be impossible to bridge. Some
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pragmatists argue that rather than set time tables, India and the United States 
should work towards progress in all directions including regional 
nonproliferation, interim global steps such as a fissile materials cut off, 
further reduction of American and Russian nuclear arsenals, and the capture 
of China, Britain and France into the net of nuclear force reductions. The 
simultaneous progress on all fronts will eventually help reduce the reliance 
on nuclear weapons for national security and marginalise them. There is 
some expectation that President Clinton in his second term, with an eye on 
history and a new focus on foreign initiatives, will be in a position to give a 
decisive push towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. It is argued that this 
opportunity should not be missed.
It may be premature for New Delhi and Washington to build hopes 
for arms control cooperation on the basis of this scenario. A number of 
factors are at work that suggest the prospects for a significant movement 
towards nuclear abolition are not bright. Although the arms control 
community in the United States is today far more serious about nuclear 
abolition, there are strong forces that are opposed to the project. First, the 
strategic community in the United States has articulated a powerful set of 
reasons for the continuing relevance of nuclear weapons. The end of the cold 
war, it is argued, has not dissolved the importance of nuclear weapons and 
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons are essential to preserve 
America’s security commitments to its allies which are of prime importance 
in maintaining a stable world order. Without the benefit of America’s 
extended nuclear deterrence, countries like Japan, Germany and Korea will 
be tempted to acquire national nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons are 
necessary to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons by the so 
called “rogue states.” Maintaining a superior American nuclear force will 
help prevent local bullies from dominating their neighbours in regions of 
vital interest to the United States assuming that Washington will be deterred 
from intervention on behalf of the victims. These formulations have been 
fully endorsed by the Pentagon, and it will not be easy to overcome this new 
theology.
Second, even if the Pentagon can be rolled over, there is growing 
opposition to arms control in the United States Congress. Increasingly 
isolationist in its outlook and deeply suspicious of multilateralism, the Senate 
is unlikely to endorse the vision of a nuclear weapon free world. On the eve 
of the November 1996 elections, the Clinton administration was forced to 
withdraw the Chemical Weapons Convention from the Senate where it was 
believed there was enough opposition to prevent its ratification. Analysts in 
Washington are also suggesting that the CTBT too will face rough ride in the 
Senate, if and when the administration sends it for ratification. The Congress
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is also forcing the Administration to spend more on missile defences; this 
could undermine the ABM Treaty as well as prospects for further nuclear 
disarmament. In the United States there has always been a view that was 
strongly opposed to basing American security on international arms control 
agreements. This view emphasized the importance of Washington relying on 
its own military capabilities to ensure that cheaters of the treaties do not 
endanger American interests.
Even if President Clinton can persuade the Congress, the other 
nuclear weapon powers are unlikely to go along with the project on nuclear 
abolition. For Britain and France, nuclear weapons seem to remain an 
important source of international status and prestige. In a denuclearised 
world, the British and French could argue that there may be little to prevent 
them from being relegated to a secondary status; it could also diminish their 
political status vis-a-vis Germany. In Russia, there has been a dramatic 
transformation in the thinking about nuclear weapons during the 1990s. 
From actively campaigning for their elimination in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Russia has now returned to new dependence on nuclear weapons in its 
security strategy. Having weakened its conventional military power, Russia 
may have no other option. As the western powers debate the expansion of 
NATO closer towards Russian borders, Moscow appears to be debating the 
adoption of the doctrine that calls for reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to 
counter the conventional superiority of the west. As a rising power, and 
apprehensive of an American drift towards containment of China, Beijing is 
unlikely to forego its nuclear deterrent. Both Russia and China could aigue 
that a world without nuclear weapons would work to the advantage of the 
United States, that has gone farthest down the road of a new military 
technical revolution based on information technologies. Recognising the 
impossibility of matching the United States in the new technological 
revolution, the lesser powers of the world may conclude that nuclear 
weapons may be essential to balance the American dominance.
Conclusion
From the preceding discussion it is obvious that nuclear weapons are 
here to stay for a long time to come. Many nation states are likely to operate 
on the premise that the combination of nuclear weapons and long range 
missiles provides an unrivalled source of power. The United States and India 
cannot hope to structure cooperation on the hope that nuclear weapons can 
be marginalised and eventually eliminated from the international calculus of 
power. Nor can they go by the premise that the existing structure of 
international power can be frozen through the strengthening of the current 
nonproliferation regime. Continued diffusion of power and the spread of
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technology as well as the political dynamics could break the current order. 
This bleak assessment does not however imply that there are no prospects for 
cooperation between India and the United States. If both the nations move 
towards a more realistic policy positions and locate their nuclear dialogue in 
a broader strategic context, it should not be impossible to develop areas of 
cooperation.
India can no longer postpone the crucial final decisions on the nature 
of its nuclear option. Its inability to be part of an alliance system and its 
determination to pursue an independent foreign policy will eventually force 
India to come to terms with its nuclear weapon capability. India’s rhetoric on 
disarmament is a poor substitute for defining a nuclear posture. Clarity on its 
nuclear weapon capability will allow India to pursue more effectively an 
arms control diplomacy that will help stabilize the balance of power in the 
Indian Ocean/Asia-Pacific region.
The United States is unlikely to succeed in capping and rolling back 
India’s nuclear and missile capability; nor can it hope to tie India down to a 
limited framework of South Asia. The challenge for the United States is in 
finding a way to accommodate India as a responsible partner in the 
management of the global nuclear order. Although the current thinking in 
Washington appears to have made nonproliferation an end in itself, the 
history of American policy reveals that nonproliferation and other normative 
goals have always been subordinated to the larger interests of balance of 
power. Once India and the United States begin to look at the importance of 
Asian security over the long term, they may be able to find ways to manage 
their nuclear divergence.
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IS THERE A TECHNICAL SOLUTION TO  
PROLIFERATION?
Alfred Lecocq
Nuclear proliferation is presently a threat to all nations and there is a 
strong need to reduce the proliferation of weapons. At the same time, states 
should be able to increase nuclear energy supply safely with an attempt to 
avoid the production of weapon grade fissile material. The development of 
the thorium cycle is essential for achieving both these goals. The liquid 
fluoride technology finds its application with the Molten Salt Fission 
Reactors (MSR) and with the Accelerator Molten Salt Breeder (AMSB), 
initially proposed in Japan fifteen years ago. The liquid fluoride technology 
was studied at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory nearly thirty years ago but 
research was wound down in 1974. Therefore, a good question is the extent 
to which a technical solution, as opposed to a purely political one, may be 
found for proliferation.
Beyond Political Treaties
Global nonproliferation proposals have not been successful in the 
real sense of the term. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) for example 
which held discussions in Geneva on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) for two years, could not reach a consensus among the participants 
because India followed by a few other nations, has refused to sign the final 
proposal as long as the five nuclear powers consisting of China, France, 
Russia, U.K. and the U.S.A. have not agreed to define a specified framework 
of time for the elimination of their own oversized nuclear arsenals. To put it 
more bluntly, none of the five nuclear weapon nations seem willing to give 
up their nuclear weapon capability.
The main objectives of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) 
and START treaties is to not only control further growth of nuclear weapons, 
but also reduce them. In addition, the fissile materials of nuclear weapons 
must be neutralized in order to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. However, 
until now, the problem of nuclear warhead elimination remains.
In addition to the nuclear threat, another important threat for 
mankind during the next century will be huge emissions of carbon dioxide 
which will induce an increased greenhouse effect, with consequences for the 
climate of the earth. As a counter to this prospect, the stabilization of 
greenhouse gases emissions at the 1990 level can be obtained if 3000 to 
5000 large nuclear power reactors are constructed globally. But this could 
increase the risk of nuclear proliferation and thus negate another key
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objective.
Thus it appears that the reduction of nuclear proliferation must use 
technical solutions appropriate for the short term as well as the long term. 
Two questions are relevant. First, how to destroy existing nuclear weapons 
without producing new fissile materials. Secondly, how to produce a large 
amount of nuclear energy in the coming century without risking weapon 
grade material diversion.
Elim ination of Existing Nuclear Weapons
The European International Working Association (EURIWA), a 
group consisting of independent nuclear technicians, has been working 
toward the reduction of nuclear proliferation and has proposed technical 
alternatives to eliminate nuclear weapons without producing any new fissile 
material usable to fabricate new nuclear weapons.
Neutralization of warheads made of Highly Enriched Uranium 
(HEU) is not a significant problem, since it is always possible to dilute this 
material in natural or depleted uranium until a convenient concentration 
(< 20 percent) is achieved which can be used later in classical fission 
reactors. A better solution would be to use it after an essential denaturation 
by the even isotopes of uranium (234U, 236U) to avoid plutonium 
production. Such fuels are the most convenient for small power research 
reactors, merchant ships, and isolated land surfaces (arctic, antarctic, deserts 
with untapped resources). The normal operation of these facilities could be 
easily checked by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with 
satellites. Another option would be to use highly enriched uranium as seed 
for thorium, which has no natural fissile isotope, to allow its use as an easy 
energy source.
On the issue of burning military plutonium, various proposals have 
been made to destroy by fission the weapons grade plutonium in 
conventional reactors, Light Water Reactor (LWR), W E R , CANDU, or Fast 
Breeder Reactor (FBR). Inert matrixes can be utilized to contain the Pu 
compound (generally oxide). This process of weapon destruction 
necessitates the simultaneous use of burnable or removable absorbers, which 
deteriorate the neutron economy. Besides, the energy production is strictly 
limited to about 90 percent of the fissile content. The residual product might 
be buried in deep repositories. Classical fertile matrixes (MOX) can be 
irradiated with thermalized or fast neutrons in the present operating nuclear 
power stations. In this case, the neutron economy is better but the use of 
uranium based matrix leads automatically to the production of fresh 




There are several lessons of the past for the fission nuclear industry. 
This industry is based on the use of uranium which was necessary for fission 
energy development. However, the uranium-plutonium fuel cycle was the 
starting point of nuclear proliferation. Historically, it could not be otherwise, 
but more precise possibilities offered by another fertile material, thorium, is 
now available for power production. The advantages of thorium include the 
following:
- Thorium is four times as abundant as uranium, and supplies 100 times 
more energy
- It breeds neither plutonium, nor long high-lived minor Actinides
- The amount of thorium waste is several orders of magnitude smaller than 
that of uranium
- The thorium cycle is self protected against proliferation by its U-232 
contents.
Thorium’s superiority is not in doubt but it does not have any fissile 
isotope. Until now, uranium was necessary for fission energy development 
and thorium cycle could not start without uranium. With the advent of 
accelerator spallators, this will not be the case.
The utilization of thorium results in the production of 233 U and 
thereby conserves the energy resources to a variable degree, depending on 
the nuclear characteristics of the industrial option. The danger of creating a 
new weapon grade material can be intrinsically avoided by tuning the 
generation of 233U towards significant contents of 232U, whose daughter 
products (212 Bi and 20S Tl) are high gamma energy emitters. While this 
contributes to proliferation resistance, it also leads to inconvenience in the 
subsequent utilization of this fissile material in the solid fuels of civilian 
classical applications. Many proposals for thorium utilization may be found 
in the literature. Some look at the use of HEU or plutonium as fissile; some 
others are devoted to classical reactors such as CANDU-Pressurised Heavy 
Water (PHW) reactors; still others to High Temperature Reactor cooled with 
helium; and to molten salt reactors.
The spallation process which supplies 30-40 neutrons by the blasting 
of each heavy nuclei with high eneigy proton, should be the most efficient 
way to produce 233 U from 232 Th. This route has been proposed within a 
global project called THORIMS-NES (Thorium Molten Salt Nuclear Energy 
Synergetics). This resulted after the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) 
studies pursued in the U.S. at the Oakridge laboratory was given up or 
stopped. The THORIMS-NES explores the whole process of energy 
production by fission, from the thorium element to waste elimination. The 
three principles of THORIMS-NES are thorium utilization, liquid fuel
23
IS THERE A TECHNICAL SOLUTION TO PROLIFERATION?
technology and separation of fissile producing facilities and power stations.
According to THORIMS-NES project, thorium releases its energy in 
thermalized reactors using liquid fluorides (Molten Salt Reactors:MSR), 
while the new fissile material, 233 U, is produced with spallation in 
Accelerators (Accelerators Molten Salt Breeders: AMSB). But presently, 
neither MSRs nor AMSBs are deployed, and nuclear weapons destruction is 
being postponed.
Proposal for CANDU-PHW Reactors
Before the development of these advanced devices, an intermediary 
step is available which helps in the recycling of warhead materials in 
CANDU reactors. Canadian studies have examined many scenarios for the 
use of fissile highly enriched uranium (HEU) or weapons plutonium (WPu), 
with a view of transmuting 232 Th into 233 U. The neutronic characteristics 
of CANDU-PHW allow to reach 30,000 Mwd/ton by mixing the fertile 
thorium with these fissiles.
The utilization of these new fissile resources, which need neither 
more enrichment facilities (to supply HEU), nor new reprocessing plants (for 
WPu production), would be an important economic trump, even if initially 
one works on Once Through Thorium cycle (OTT), i.e., without retreatment 
of irradiated thorium. With this management option, although not the 
optimal one, the irradiated materials are considered as mines of fissiles, to be 
exploited in the future.
During the eighties, many fuel cycle studies were conducted in India 
to reach a self sustained use of thorium with CANDU-PHW reactors. An 
assessment of the needs in basic materials (U and Pu), and in industrial 
capacity including fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and ston"~ ’ >pent fuel, to 
have a self-sustained management grounded on the thorium cycle, shows that 
the main difficulty is to have, initially, a highly concentrated fissile product. 
Its previous fabrication should tie up a large amount of money to build big 
industrial enrichment facilities (for 235U), or new reprocessing plants to 
extract plutonium which is originally produced from natural uranium in 
CANDU - PHW reactors. Thus, it appears that the lack of a necessary initial 
quantity of fissile material is a heavy handicap for India's development.
In an other study conducted at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, 
it was shown that a power increase, with a doubling time of about 14 years, 
could be easily obtained with CANDU-PHW near breeders, provided that 
there is a make-up of fissile. Therefore, the disposal of HEU or WPu from 
nuclear weapons could allow India, where sufficient expertise has been built 
up, to take up work in this field. India would be able to exploit sooner than 
later, the huge reserves (3,60,000 tons) of thorium it possesses.
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In the coming years, it may be said without any doubt that the 
CANDU proposal is better than the MSR one. Several nations have chosen 
to undertake the CANDU route for their nuclear energy supply. Canada and 
India have wide experience with these reactors, but other nations (Argentina, 
Korea, Pakistan and Romania) will have the same knowledge. These nations 
which were never involved in the past nuclear weapon race, or have always 
denied having military projects (like India), could under the strict control of 
IAEA, technically start the reduction of the nuclear arms stockpiles.
In spite of the ending of Oak Ridge studies in 1974, several states 
have gained a good knowledge on molten salt reactor possibilities. Many 
calculations and experiments have been performed in Japan, Russia, France 
on breeders, converters and denatured MSR.
It can be concluded that for the present time, CANDU-PHW is the 
available way to destroy Pu nuclear weapons. It is also true to say that 
molten salt applications have the highest potentialities to fight against 
proliferation and terrorism. The threat of proliferation by laser enrichment of 
reactor grade plutonium can be eliminated by burning this plutonium in MSR 
or AMSB. The looming threat of energy shortage could become 
meaningless if states have the will to cooperate for the welfare of mankind.
In order to move now toward achieving this long term project several 
steps may be taken. For the destruction of weapon grade plutonium (WPu), 
CANDU reactors should be used with Pu02  -Th O2 mixtures as fuel. For 
this, a short term cooperative plan of ten to twenty years needs to be 
formulated under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Collaboration should be facilitated between nuclear weapon states and the 
nations which have a good knowledge of CANDU reactors and cannot be 
suspected of proliferation motivations. For the longer term plan, Molten Salt 
applications (MSR and AMSB) are proposed to relay the CANDUs, in order 
to achieve the treatment of nuclear waste and to supply the non proliferating 
fissile mixtures produced in highly safeguarded international centers. The 
expected second nuclear era could be on its way.
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In 1952, General Omar Bradley of the United States said that the 
only way to win an atomic war was to make certain that it is never started. 
Since those days, through nearly a lifetime of confrontation and negotiation 
on arms control, disarmament and the limitation of nuclear weapons 
proliferation, nations have come closer to collectively winning this war. As 
this Seminar explores the challenges and prospects for international nuclear 
cooperation, it is useful to recall that such cooperation has long been 
suspected of concealing nuclear arms proliferation in its shadow. Regimes of 
verification or safeguards designed to cast light into this shadow have thus 
become a cornerstone of peaceful international nuclear cooperation.
In this piece, I would like to describe some of the activities being 
pursued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through its 
Board of Governors, to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system. I will first briefly put these 
activities into an historical perspective to illustrate the motivation and 
rationale of the measures under consideration.
A Historical Perspective
Nearly 40 years ago the statute of the IAEA came into force, thereby 
providing for the first international system of safeguards to verify that 
nuclear materials and facilities were not used to further any military purpose. 
Although the first systematic and documented IAEA safeguards system, 
approved in early 1961, was limited to small reactors, it was subsequently 
revised and expanded several times to take account of the full range of 
nuclear fuel cycle activities. In 1968, the Agency’s Safeguards System, 
INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, was approved.
International safeguards were thereafter at the disposal of states to 
verify that nuclear materials and facilities were not being used to further any 
military purpose. Before this point, nuclear cooperation had largely taken 
place under bilateral cooperation agreements. If there were verification 
provisions in these agreements they were, for the most part, carried out 
bilaterally. INFCIRC/66 provided for the first time an internationally 
endorsed and administered system of safeguards measures. States entering 
into nuclear cooperation could and did take advantage of this system in 
connection with the nuclear trade between them. Dozens of such agreements 
were concluded, each usually covering a specific project or transfer of 
nuclear material, equipment or technology.
93+2 PROGRAMME PROPOSAL
In March 1970, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came 
into force and with it the need for an alternative system of safeguards to 
verify the more far reaching obligations undertaken by its parties. The NPT 
called for parties to enter into agreements with the Agency for the express 
purpose of verifying that nuclear material in peaceful use in the state was not 
diverted to the production of nuclear explosives. Safeguards agreements 
pursuant to the Treaty were comprehensive in nature, applicable to all 
nuclear material in the state at any time, present or future.
Within a year this new system of safeguards was developed and 
approved by the Board of Governors, formally the “Structure and Content of 
Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with 
the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” otherwise and more 
simply known as “INFCIRC/153.” This form of agreement came to be 
known as the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in light of its 
comprehensive application to all nuclear materials in present and future 
peaceful nuclear activities in the state.
In the ensuing years most of the INFCIRC/66 agreements 
administered by the Agency were superseded as more and more states 
became party to the NPT or other treaties requiring similar comprehensive 
safeguards, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Today, safeguards agreements are in force in 125 states, most of 
these being comprehensive safeguards agreements. Active INFCIRC/66 
agreements continue to be administered in only three states, i.e., nonnuclear 
weapon states with significant nuclear programmes. From the point of view 
of verification, there is a crucial distinction to be made between these two 
systems that is fundamental to understanding the conception and 
development of the Agency programme to make safeguards more effective 
and efficient.
Under the INFCIRC/66 system the items subject to verification are 
specifically identified in advance. For example, an agreement might apply 
only to one power reactor and to the nuclear material therein. Under the 
NPT the state party is obliged to declare all nuclear material in peaceful 
activities on its territory or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere. The 
Agency has at its disposal well established accounting, containment and 
surveillance measures that provide a high level of certainty that declared 
material has not been diverted. But there can be no absolute guarantee that 
all of the material that should have been declared has been declared. The 
inspector is thus faced with the challenge of determining, with an acceptable 
level of certainty, that the declaration is correct and complete and that no 
undeclared activities have been undertaken.
In the negotiations leading to the comprehensive safeguards system 
some nonnuclear weapon states expressed concern about the protection of
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their commercial and industrial secrets. Others thought that the cost of 
intrusive inspection would put them at a competitive disadvantage with the 
nuclear weapon states which, under the NPT, were not subject to safeguards 
inspection. The system which received international acceptance responded 
in some measure to these concerns. Inspectors would be required to focus on 
declared nuclear materials and there were few provisions for inspectors to 
look beyond so called strategic points. Thus, nuclear material or facilities 
not declared by the state could go undetected. The architects of the system 
were not blind to this limitation but, with cold war logic, it was presumed 
that significant undeclared activities would likely be detected by the 
sophisticated information gathering apparatus of the nuclear weapon states. 
In spite of this shortcoming, the NPT safeguards system brought greatly 
improved assurances and was to become instrumental in facilitating 
international nuclear cooperation.
If this shortcoming had faded from view with time, Iraq and its secret 
nuclear weapons programme brought it abruptly back into sharp focus. Iraq, 
a party to the NPT, had embarked upon a secret programme to develop a 
nuclear weapon in direct violation of its treaty obligations. The discovery 
shocked the international community and, consequently, jolted many 
intelligence agencies. If information was available at the time it certainly 
was not brought to the attention of the Agency. In the aftermath of the Gulf 
war, the UN Security Council gave the IAEA the mission to remove, destroy 
or render harmless the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme. To execute this 
mission the Agency was granted powers almost like those of a military 
occupation force. While the Agency’s Iraq Action Team has been very 
successful in rooting out the details of the clandestine programme, it seems 
unlikely that such powers would ever be accorded voluntarily by a sovereign 
state. If the non-proliferation regime was to be strengthened it would have to 
be done through the collective agreement and action of a large number of 
states.
Programme 93+2 Proposal
Even before the revelations in Iraq, the IAEA had taken steps to 
strengthen the safeguards system. During 1992 and early 1993 the Board 
made decisions regarding the early provision to the Agency of nuclear 
facility design information. The Agency’s right, under comprehensive 
safeguards agreements, to undertake special inspections to ensure all nuclear 
materials were under safeguards was confirmed. A voluntary reporting 
scheme on imports and exports of specified equipment and material was also 
approved. However, it was the discovery in Iraq that led the Agency to 
systematically reconsider the effectiveness of the NPT safeguards regime. In
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June 1993 the Agency’s Board of Governors requested the Director General 
to bring forward concrete proposals for strengthening safeguards and 
improving its cost effectiveness. The Director General’s Standing Advisory 
Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) outlined a plan and in 
December 1993 the Director General proposed to the Board of Governors a 
two year programme to evaluate the technical, legal and financial aspects of 
new measures. This came to be known as Programme 93+2.
The fundamental problem facing the Agency was to increase the 
probability of detecting nuclear activities that had not been declared by the 
sate. Accounting for declared material could be done with suitable certainty. 
But no safeguards system, no matter how extensive the measures, can 
provide absolute assurance that there has been no diversion of nuclear 
material or that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in a state. The 
level of assurance depends upon a combination of elements including the 
extent to which related materials and activities are covered; the nature and 
intensity of safeguards measures; the extent of cooperation with state 
authorities and facility operators; and the nature of the fuel cycle and 
associated activities. The secretariat believed that improved assurances 
could be acquired through a higher level of cooperation with the state, 
increased use of advanced technology and access to more information and to 
more locations in the state.
The most far reaching proposal was to dramatically increase the 
inspectors’ access to information about nuclear activities and nuclear related 
activities in the state and access to locations where these activities take place. 
Agency experience in Iraq had demonstrated the value of assembling the 
largest possible knowledge base about the nuclear programme under 
inspection. A nuclear weapons programme requires the bringing together 
of unique and sophisticated equipment, skills and development activities. 
The more that is known about nuclear activities in a state the more evident 
will be activities that do not fit with the declared programme and which 
should be investigated further.
In addition to information already routinely provided to the Agency 
under comprehensive safeguards agreements, it was proposed that states 
provide information on past nuclear activities to the extent necessary to 
enable the verification of the completeness and correctness of the state’s 
declaration. Additional information would be sought regarding the nature 
and location of nuclear research and development activities and of facilities 
manufacturing major items of nuclear equipment. The proposal also foresaw 
the provision of additional information on the activities of nuclear sites and 
locations related to nuclear sites. Relevant imports and exports, uranium and 
thorium deposits and related mining activity would also be declared.
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Information useful to the safeguards inspector can come from many 
sources; the state itself, trade journals, newspapers and industrial sources as 
well as importers from and exporters to a state. All of this adds detail to the 
picture of a state’s nuclear programme. Any contradictions and 
inconsistencies in the information can be then be checked through physical 
access and inspection at the site. In retrospect, even the secret Iraqi 
programme left clues to its existence. For example, there were press reports 
of equipment procurement activity prior to the Gulf War which, if noted and 
followed up, may have led to earlier detection. The safeguards system then 
in place did not systematically seek out such information nor was there 
authority to investigate information received except in very specific 
circumstances. These new proposals would change that. In addition to 
demanding much more detailed information from the state itself, the 
secretariat would establish a comprehensive system for the collection and 
review of information from all sources.
The sampling of nuclear materials is an inspection measure used 
extensively in safeguards. It was such sampling that revealed that the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had separated more plutonium from 
spent reactor fuel than it had declared. It was proposed to complement this 
procedure by implementing a new and powerful tool for collecting evidence 
of nuclear activity through samples collected from the dust, soil, plants or 
water in the environment. Through sophisticated analysis techniques, traces 
of many past and present nuclear activities can be detected, sometimes at 
great distances. Environmental sampling is now used routinely in Iraq and 
Agency inspectors have begun applying it in states with comprehensive 
safeguards agreements. The Agency has built a special “clean laboratory” at 
its Seibersdorf Laboratories near Vienna to facilitate the analytical work.
Increased physical access was proposed to nuclear sites on which 
facilities exist, to sites with nuclear related manufacturing and research 
activities and to other locations where the Agency had identified an interest. 
Inconsistencies or questions arising from the information provided can 
sometimes be resolved only through unrestricted on-site inspection. To be 
most effective, access should be unannounced or on short notice, at least 
some of the time. Some states still insist on single entry visas for inspectors, 
frustrating any attempt to conduct such an inspection. Some states even limit 
the number or prescribe the nationality of inspectors they will accept, thus 
reducing the efficiency of personnel utilization.
Of course, the fullest possible cooperation of states is required to 
make safeguards effective and credible. A more detailed description of the 
activities undertaken by the state’s system of accounting and control was 
suggested to identify areas where cooperation could allow a more efficient
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use of time and resources. The adoption of simplified inspector designation 
procedures and the issuing of multi-entry visas or eliminating the need for 
visas altogether was suggested to enhance effectiveness by facilitating 
unannounced or short notice inspections.
The proposal also considered optimizing the use of advances in 
technology. Unattended, remotely monitored equipment and remote 
transmission of data, including images was foreseen. Communications and 
information technology could be used to better advantage. Advanced non­
destructive analysis techniques could help meet the Agency’s measurement 
needs. Even commercially available satellite imagery has possibilities for 
the safeguards system. Optimal use of technology would not only improve 
effectiveness but would reduce costs.
A parallel objective of Programme 93+2 was increasing the cost 
effectiveness of the safeguards system. The Board was particularly keen on 
quantifying savings that could be realized from each of the proposed 
measures. The work that has gone into analysing costs has shown that the 
new measures will initially add to the safeguards bill but that these costs will 
eventually be offset by savings resulting from efficiencies in the new 
measures. The programme is thus expected to be cost neutral eventually, 
while being more effective. One difficulty in making precise cost predictions 
arises from the interrelationships of the proposed measures and which 
measures will be accepted, rejected or modified by the Board. Many of the 
measures complement each other to the extent that the full benefit will be 
realized only if they are taken together.
Implications of Programme 93+2
In June 1995, the Board noted the secretariat’s intention to proceed 
with the implementation of those proposed measures already authorised 
under existing safeguards agreements. However, in order to implement some 
of the proposed measures, it was considered necessary to obtain additional 
legal authority to complement that already provided by comprehensive 
safeguards agreements. It was agreed, therefore, that the implementation of 
Programme 93+2 would henceforth proceed in two parts: Part 1 being those 
measures for which the legal authority for implementation existed; and Part 2 
being those for which complementary legal authority would have to be 
sought.
The implementation of Part 1 has proceeded over the past year. 
Additional information has been sought on nuclear programmes and related 
activities through a questionnaire sent to all states with operative 
comprehensive safeguards agreements. Information on certain closed down 
or decommissioned nuclear facilities and on nuclear facilities which were
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built but where nuclear material has not been introduced was sought as well.
Initially, evironmental sampling is being focused on enrichment and 
hot-cell facilities. Guidelines have been developed, facility-specific 
sampling objectives, plans and procedures are being developed and 
consultations with member states regarding implementation are well 
underway. Analytical equipment for the clean laboratory has been installed 
and has been in full operation since the summer.
A mechanism for reviewing the significantly increased volume of 
information foreseen has been put in place. A methodology for improved 
information review has been further developed and a number of software 
tools to aid implementation are installed. Pocedures for protecting 
confidential information have been reviewed and are being consolidated and 
updated. Particular attention is being paid to the means of controlling access 
to confidential information in computer files. A group of member state 
expert consultants has reviewed the secretariat's procedures for protecting 
the anonymity of samples and the confidentiality of results. The consultants 
agreed that the procedures meet the objectives of the Agency and of member 
states.
With respect to increased physical access, work is underway to 
identify how short notice inspections, particularly in combination with 
additional operational data and advanced technology, could lead to more 
effective and efficient safeguards for a number of facility types. 
Administrative procedures necessary to support short notice inspections as 
part of the routine implementation of safeguards have been developed.
A wide variety of advanced technology for remote monitoring and 
transmission, and unattended measurements with remote transmission is 
being examined and demonstrated. This includes digital surveillance 
systems, electronic seals as well as motion and radiation detectors, and 
remote data transmission by satellite and telephone lines. The objective is 
the development of new safeguards approaches for locations which combine 
the new technology with short notice inspections thereby permitting 
reductions in inspection frequency and effort. Applications of advanced 
technology are being demonstrated at facilities in the United States, South 
Africa and Switzerland. In all cases the demonstrations provide for the 
authentication requirements of the Agency and the encryption requirements 
of the state.
States’ responses to a questionnaire about their regulatory, 
accounting and control systems has provided a mechanism for a systematic 
exploration of areas of increased cooperation which could benefit both the 
Agency and the state. There has been a concern in some states that increased 
cooperation will result in a transfer of costs from the Agency to the state.
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However, experience in EURATOM and Programme 93+2 field trials has 
been that after an initial investment in consultations and training, both sides 
can save resources.
A number o f training courses necessary for the implementation of 
Part 1 measures are in various stages o f development, pilot testing and 
implementation. A training course on environmental sample collection and 
handling is in place and soon more than 100 inspectors will have received 
this training. Training courses on enhanced observation skills are being 
tested and other courses dealing with the conduct o f short notice inspections 
and design verification of closed down and decommissioned facilities are 
under development as are courses for the training o f state personnel.
As the implementation of Part 1 o f the programme proceeds, Part 2 
has been the subject o f  intense discussion in the Board o f Governors. At its 
meetings in December 1995 and March 1996, the Board discussed and 
provided views and comments on the Part 2 measures. Taking account of 
these comments, the secretariat further developed the concepts, and in June 
this year tabled an updated proposal together with a draft legal text o f a 
Protocol. In his recommendation to the Board, the Director General said that 
the measures proposed, together with the measures already adopted, would 
complete the envisaged package. They would provide the Agency with a 
more complete picture of the state’s nuclear programme, would secure 
Agency access to corroborate this information should the need arise, and 
would enable the Agency to rely on the increased assurances provided by the 
new measures to manage the system in a more cost-efficient manner by 
foregoing some of the routine verification activities currently carried out.
The Director General pointed out the package o f measures sought to 
strike a proper balance between the Agency’s need for information and 
access and the state’s need to protect its legitimate interests. It had been 
arrived at through an intensive process of consultation with member states 
and the conduct of field trials over the last two years. According to him, it 
was for member states to translate the measures into new rights and 
obligations through finalization of the draft protocol.
The Director General recommended that the Board, through an 
appropriate mechanism, finalize a legal instrument taking as a basis the 
secretariat’s draft protocol and explanation of the measures. The mechanism 
the Board found appropriate was an open-ended committee, the Committee 
on Strengthening the EffFectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the 
Safeguards System, known locally as Committee 24. Under the leadership of 
the Board Chairman, work has begun to draft a Protocol through which 
states party to comprehensive safeguards agreements could undertake 
obligations to enhance the safeguards system. The Committee completed a
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first reading of the secretariat’s text in July of this year and a second reading 
in September. The current Board Chairman, Ambassador Peter Walker of 
Canada, has produced a “Rolling Text” based on the Committee debate and 
his own consultations. The Committee meets again in January 1997 for a 
third reading based on this Rolling Text.
Contending Issues
In the committee debate a number of issues have crystallized that 
will have to be resolved before wide agreement is likely. One of these is the 
issue of so called “universality.” Although the term has been used loosely it 
reflects two concerns. First, many states advocate the universal application 
of any new measures to states with non-comprehensive safeguards 
agreements, both the INFCIRC/66 agreements and the voluntary offer 
agreements entered into by the nuclear weapon states. In some respects this 
point is more political than practical since the measures have been developed 
as a package explicitly to complement comprehensive safeguards and many 
are simply not relevant under these agreements. This said, some of the 
measures, like simplification of inspector designation and country entry 
procedures, for example, would be helpful and could be undertaken by such 
states. Reporting by these states of nuclear exports and imports would 
strengthen the safeguards applied in the states With comprehensive 
agreements.
Secondly, there is a view in some quarters that any additional 
safeguards measures applied in nonnuclear weapon states should be equally 
applied in the nuclear weapon states in the belief that there should be an 
equality of any inconvenience or costs that might result from the new 
safeguards measures. There is an associated concern that the measures may 
burden the nuclear industry in nonnuclear weapon states to the extent that 
competitors in the nuclear weapon tales will derive unearned advantage. 
However, as disarmament progresses, any inequality of burden should 
diminish. Already large numbers of warheads have been dismantled and this 
process is bound to continue. Both Russia and the United States have said 
that these materials will be placed under IAEA verification as endorsed by 
the NPT Review Conference in 1995 and the Moscow Nuclear Summit. 
Already the Agency is verifying that some nuclear materials removed from 
military use in the United States is not returned to nuclear weapons use. The 
Director General, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy and the U.S. 
Secretary of Energy have convened a joint working group to explore the 
technical, legal and financial issues connected with such verification. The 
group will report its progress in June 1997.
A second issue is the confidentiality of information gathered by the
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Agency, both commercial proprietary information and security information. 
W hile confidentiality was an issue in 1970 in the negotiations of 
INFCIRC/153, experience has shown that information held by the secretariat 
has been .otyiHMBjp TM$ M lkf te$m& the validity of the
concern nor justifies complacency. The secretariat is now consolidating and
further documenting its information security policies and procedures and will 
update them as necessary to ensure acceptable protection.
A third issue is physical access. An important question is to which 
locations will access be guaranteed and what freedom will be given to 
inspectors to demand it. The most difficult aspect of this issue has been 
access to private property on which no nuclear material is located, for 
example, laboratories carrying out research and development work on 
uranium enrichment processes or equipment. In many states existing nuclear 
legislation does not grant regulators access unless there are radioactive or 
other specified materials present. While there is general agreement that 
some form of “due process” is appropriate, each impediment reduces the 
system’s effectiveness. Some argue that the Special Inspection provisions 
now existing under INFCIRC/153 is a sufficiently powerful tool to gain 
access where essential. Others believe that the required involvement o f the 
Board in the Special Inspection procedure risks unnecessarily dramatizing 
inspections that may be seeking only to resolve question which, in the end, 
are minor.
A related question is the notice and timing of complementary access. 
In some cases it is clear that the shorter the notice the more effective the 
inspection. The Secretariat has proposed two hours notice as meaningful and 
feasible for the most important “short-notice” inspections. Longer periods 
have been suggested by some states. Also, some states have proposed that 
notice should include the reason for access, activity to be performed and a 
justification of the complementary access. Such conditions could seriously 
limit the usefulness of the inspection.
A few states have indicated a preference for proceeding such that 
safeguards obligations would be subject to any limitations imposed by their 
national and constitutional law. This notion arose particularly in the context 
o f complementary access to private property where there was no nuclear 
material located which is a legitimate concern. Nonetheless, the idea is 
clearly unworkable and would be unacceptable by any standard of 
international law. Alternative ways of dealing with access issues will have to 
be found.
In the end it will be a  decision of the Board o f Governors that 
determines how effective and efficient the safeguards system will become. 
These measures will not only influence the activities now performed under
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existing safeguards agreements but will set a standard and expectation for 
verification to be performed under future agreements. As is the case for 
existing treaties, future disarmament and nonproliferation agreements will 
require credible verification and a high assurance that cheating will be 
detected. It is hoped that a broader and longer term view of the benefits to be 
derived from an effective non-proliferation verification scheme, such as that 
now under discussion in Vienna, will be carefully considered by all member 
states, and that there will be sufficient political will to reach consensus on an 
effective package of improvements. When this is realised, we will have 




A STATE OF THE ART
S. Sadasivan
The recently concluded Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
envisages four monitoring techniques, namely, seismic, hydroacoustic, 
infrasound (microbarographic), and radionuclide as one of the requirements 
for compliance verification. Under Article IV of the CTBT, these four 
systems form part of the International Monitoring System (IMS). The 
verification tasks associated with the CTBT are technologically the most 
advanced and go further than any other existing treaty.
The technical specifications for the four monitoring systems will be 
described in the operation manuals which are yet to be issued. The IMS is 
described in Part I of the Protocol attached to the CTBT and changes of 
administrative or technical nature could be effected easily in the Protocol as 
well as the Treaty. Lists of network of stations where these monitoring 
facilities will be located are available. Expert groups on the monitoring 
technologies were established by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and 
the groups met regularly in 1994 and 1995 at the CD. All four groups were 
asked to freeze the individual monitoring system specifications and then 
design a network for detecting & identifying a nuclear explosion of 1 kiloton 
(kT) yield conducted underground, underwater or in the atmosphere, either 
evasively or non-evasively in any part of the globe. The key parameters in 
network design were the number of ground based stations, the sampling and 
analyses methods, the reporting timeliness and the sensitivity and synergy 
with other techniques. Where possible, the stations were to be co-located 
with any other system that forms part of the IMS. The expert-groups 
submitted their final recommendations to the ad hoc comittee on nuclear test 
ban in December 1995. Below, the four monitoring mechanisms are briefly 
described.
Seismic M onitoring
The Seismic monitoring network is on a two-tier basis, comprising 
50 primary stations which will provide data on-line and 120 auxiliary 
stations which will on request transmit data immediately. For the primary 
network array element and one vertical component with short period sensors 
is specified. The equipment requirements include a seismometer noise of 10 
decibel (dB) below the minimum local seismic noise over the passband, 
relative location of array elements known to within lm, seismometer 
dynamic range of 96 dB with a linearity of 90 dB over the pass band and
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orientation better than 3 degrees. The data availability should be greater than 
99 percent. The equipment at the auxiliary stations are required to be 
eventually similar and the data availability should be greater than 95 percent.
Some of these stations are to operate as backup for the primary 
network and as such should have the same characteristics. The installation 
(if need be), upgradation and operation and maintenance costs of the primary 
network stations are to be borne by the CTBT organisation whereas that of 
the auxiliary stations are expected to be borne by the member states. The 
data transmitting costs of both networks will be borne by the CTBT 
organisation. The seismic network is expected to detect explosions of 0.51 
kT yield over most of the earth. The localisation of events of magnitude 
greater than 4 is expected to be with an uncertainty of 1000 sq.kms., or less. 
Coverage of some broad ocean areas in the southern hemisphere is by 
synergy with the hydroacoustic network.
Hydroacoustic Monitoring
The hydroacoustic network is to detect underwater and sub-oceanic 
events. The system is capable of detecting explosions below l kT yield, 
discriminating between explosions and sub-oceanic earthquakes and 
providing independent location of events if they are detected by a minimum 
of three stations. The system however, cannot differentiate between nuclear 
and conventional explosions. It can detect events in the low atmosphere 
(over water) which the seismic or infrasound systems may not detect. The 
hydroacoustic signal, which is a sound wave that propagates through ocean, 
can travel over large distances due to low attenuation and the SOFAR 
channel which acts as a waveguide. The axis of the SOFAR channel occurs 
at depths near 1 km in equatorial and mid-latitude waters and becomes 
shallower at high latitudes, reaching the surface in polar regions. The 
hydroacoustic sensors can detect sub-kiloton events at ranges exceeding 
5000 kms. Hydro-phones of spherical shape, which are omnidirectional and 
made of robust ceramics are proposed. Single hydrophones properly 
decoupled from the suspension cable against flow induced vibrations are to 
be positioned at the SOFAR channel axis depth with an accuracy of 10 
metres and a horizontal positioning accuracy of 30 metres.
The system requirements follow closely that of the seismic system 
where applicable. Acting on a suggestion by the Indian expert that 
underwater explosions can also be detected through the seismo- 
hydroacoustic signals by coastal/island seismic stations and after careful 
evaluation of available past data in this regard, the expert group 
recommended that the hydroacoustic network should comprise six 
hydrophone stations (fixed cable) and five island-seismic stations (T-phase
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stations), ail of which would transmit data in real time. The network is 
expected to detect explosions of 1 kT and lower with a localisation capability 
of the order of (000 sq.kms., in conjunction with some additional existing 
coastal seismic stations.
Infrasound M onitoring
This system is capable of detecting atmospheric explosions at 
altitudes ranging from sea level to about 100 kms. A network can detect the 
event in a few hours and can locate with an accuracy of 100 kms or better. 
The method can differentiate between an explosion and other atmospheric 
phenomena like lightning and volcanic eruptions, but not between nuclear 
and other explosions, just like hydroacoustic. The recommended infrasound 
sensor is a microbarograph with a fiat frequency response from 0.02 to 5.0 
Hz, with a resolution of 0.01 Pa at I Hz and a dynamic range of at least 80 
db.
A station is to have a four element array with optimal spacing 
between the elements in the range of 1 to 3 kms. The digital data from the 
station would be transmitted on line to the international data centre (IDC), 
whose location has yet to be decided. The infrasound network will have 60 
stations most of which are co-located with other proposed systems. The 
performance evaluation of the network by two study groups have been at 
variance. The detection yield is less than one kT worldwide with a location 
uncertainty of less than 50 km radius as per one algorithm. The same figures 
from another data processing algorithm are 1 to 5 kT (depending on the 
latitude) and 100 kms.
Radionuclide M onitoring
Radionuclide monitoring is the only technique that can provide 
unambiguous evidence of a nuclear explosion. For tests in the lower 
atmosphere up to tropopause, ground based stations may be able to detect the 
fresh radioactivity released by an explosion. The method can be used in 
combination with infrasound. The expert group recommended a network and 
system specifications for detection, with 90 percent probability, of a 1 kT 
explosion in the atmosphere by at least one station within about 14 days 
including a reporting period of three days.
The radioactivity monitoring system consists of sampling and 
analysis of both particulated and Xenon gas produced in the nuclear 
explosion. The recommended equipment specifications for particulate 
monitoring are an aerosol sampler which is capable of collecting particles of
0.1 to 5 KM at a flow rate of 500 cu. m/h through a low-pressure drop filter, 
suitable gamma analysis system with a HPGe of at least 40 percent or higher
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efficiency and the associated multichannel analyser. The sampling time 
should be typically one day, counting time of one day and a reporting time 
up to three days. The samples could be analysed in a laboratory if the 
sample could be transported in 24 hours. The station availability should be 
more than ninety five percent. These specifications, it was agreed could 
detect explosions of even 0.001 kT yield, depending on the location of the 
station and the source. The network that was recommended has 80 stations 
for particulate monitoring and initially 40 of these would be equipped with 
Xenon samplers too. The suggested (minimum) radionuclides to be analysed 
are Zr and Nb-95, Zr-97, Mo and Tc-99m, Ru-103,1-131, Te-132,1-133, Cs- 
134, 136 and 137, Ba-140 and Ce-143 with an analytical sensitivity in the 
range of 1-60 uBq/cu.m. The list of isotopes given above are perhaps only 
indicative and it is expected that the operation manual will specify more 
fission products to be analysed. The data, namely, gamma spectra data, will 
be transmitted to the IDC, as soon as they are ready for each sample.
The IMS is also expected to have the capability for Xe-131m, Xe- 
133 and Xe-133m sampling and analysis. The sampling rate is to be about 
l0Cu.m/day and the sensitivity envisaged is about 1 to 30 mBq/cu.m. 
Within the radionuclide system, there is a recommendation to establish 
certified laboratories which can ensure quality assurance and authenticate 
measurements in the stations nearby. These labs would also help in the 
routine analysis of samples sent to them. The expert groups provided cost 
estimates for these networks and also indicated systems as well networks 
which may need further development. These other systems are discussed 
below.
Costs, Timeliness and Detection Capability of Networks
The CTBT organisation will comprise of a technical secretariat 
which will oversee the IMS. The secretariat would establish, as necessary, 
new monitoring stations or upgrade the existing ones. The cost of 
establishing stations will be borne by the CTBTO, if necessary. The 
operations and maintenance (O&M) and data transmission costs will also be 
borne by the CTBTO. The monitoring stations will be owned and operated 
by the state parties. In the case of auxiliary seismic stations, it is expected 
that state parties will bear the cost of establishing the station and only the 
data transmission costs are to be charged to the CTBTO.
The expert groups provided approximate cost estimates for the four 
networks as well as the estimated detection capability vis-a-vis the original 
requirements. Some typical sensor and station requirements for the four 




Examples of Sensor Specifications and Station Requirements
Sensor soecifications Station requirements
1. Seismic M onitoring System
- Pass band 0.04 to 16 Hz or 
0.04 to 1 Hz & 0.5 to 8 Hz
- Noise 10 dB below the min. local 
noise over the pass band
- Dynamic range 96 dB minimum
- Linearity 90 dB over the pass 
band
- Calibration within 5 percent in 
amp. and 5 degrees in phase ■
- Op. temperature, resolution, 
sample rate.
- Array with one vertical comp.
- Transmission delay less than 
5 mins.
- Data availability more than 99 
percent (Alpha) and more than 
95 percent (Beta)
- Location and timing precision
2. Infrasound Monitoring System
- Wideband microbarograph
- Flat freq. resp. over 0.02 to 5 Hz
- Dynamic range of 80 dB or better
- Resolution of 0.01 Pa at 1 Hz
- Four elements array 
Spacing between 1 to 3 kms.
- Approx. 0.25 sq. km. level 
terrain
- Digital data to be sent on line
3. Hydroacoustic Monitoring System
- Pass band 5 to 100 Hz
- Calibration within 1 dB
- Dynamic range 10 dB
- One active hydrophone
- Station noise once/d, 10s only
- Timing accuracy needed
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4. Radionuclide Monitoring System
Particulate Monitoring
- Capable of detecting following 




' Mo-99 20-60 3
Ru-103 3-10 3









HPGe or beta-gamma coinc. 





Air sampling rate 500 cu. m/hr 
with more than 80 percent eff. 
for 0.2um
Sampling time 24 hrs 
Reporting time 3 days 
Transport/decay time 24 hrs 
HPGe detector with more than 
40 percent eff.
Network down time less than 
5 percent
Station down time less than 
15 d/y total
- Air sampling rate 10 cu.m/d
- Sampling time 6 hrs?
- Sample processing time less 
than 24 hrs
- Network down time less than 
5 percent
J.
The costs for establishing new stations have been worked out by 
various expert groups. For seismic primary, no establishment or installation 
costs are indicated, as most of them are on line under the Group of Scientific 
Experts on Technical Test-3 (GSETT-3). For the seismic auxiliary, the cost 
of establishing stations is estimated to be about 10 million U.S. dollars. The 
O&M and communication costs for the auxiliary seismic are estimated to be 
6 to 12 million dollars. In the case of hydrophones, the cost for installation
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was estimated to be 14 to 22 million dollars while the O&M costs was 
expected to be less than I million dollars per year. The data transmission 
costs could be about 7 million dollars. For infrasound the installation and 
O&M costs were given as about II and 3.6 to 4.0 million dollars 
respectively. The installation of particulate monitoring stations for 
radionuclide technique was estimated as 12 to 16 million dollars white O&M 
costs was given as about 2.0 to 4.5 million dollars, depending on the type of 
(manual or automatic) air monitoring system.to be used. The installation and 
O&M costs for rare gas monitoring is 12 million dollars each.
In the case of seismic primary, most of the stations (50) are already 
on line. About 80 percent of auxiliary seismic stations were likely to be 
ready by 1996 end. The calibration of these systems however is expected to 
take several years. The radionuclide and infra-sound monitoring stations are 
expected to be on line in 3 to 4 years time.
The detection capability of the networks were also analysed by the 
expert groups. Several member states presented their own assessment of the 
detection capability using different models. The seismic monitoring was 
expected to detect explosions in the yield range 0.5 to 1.0 kT with a 
localisation o f less than 1000 to more than 20000 sqkm. For the infrasound 
monitoring system, U.S. models estimated that explosions in the range of 0.2 
to 0.7 kT could be detected over most parts of the globe with a localisation of 
less than 50 km radius. The French results however showed that the 
detection capability would be in range of less than 0.1 to more than 10 kT 
depending on the test site. The localisation was expected to be much greater 
than 100 km radius over most of the globe. The hydroacoustic system was 
generally expected to detect less than 1 kT but the system would require 
supplem ental data from additional 4 T-phase stations. The radioactivity 
(particulate) monitoring would give 60 to 70% detection probability 10 days 
after the event.
The probability for detection by rare gas monitoring was estimated 
to be 70 to 80% for 1 kT, provided 10% of the total inventory of xenon 
isotopes were released within the first 12 hours. If the venting is only of the 
order of 0.01%, the probability for detection would be very low, about 20 
percent. The background xenon over Europe is about 20 mBq/cu.m and 
would substantially interfere with the rare gas monitoring system. 
Some other monitoring networks, example electro magnetic pulse (BMP) 
monitoring, satellite monitoring and aircraft monitoring were also discussed 
by the expert groups. The Chinese advocated a EMP monitoring network 
while Russia was particular about monitoring from air borne platforms. 
These methods however, did not find substantial support among the experts. 
However, as per the treaty, new technologies which will make the IMS more
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effective can always be introduced in the protocol. As per the treaty a 
country’s position in the CTBTO, especially in the Apex Executive Council 
will also be determined by the number of monitoring stations the said 
country hosts.
India was to have had one station each for the seismic primary and 
auxiliary, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring. In addition, Bhaba 
Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Mumbai, was offered by India as a 
Radionuclide Certification Laboratory. The coordinates for these were also 
listed in the treaty text till July 1996. The text submitted and passed by UN 
General Assembly however does not contain any reference to the Indian 
stations and laboratory.
U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE 
STEWARDSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
Christopher E. Paine
An analysis of current global nuclear stockpile growth, reduction and 
costs would be incomplete without an outline and explanation of the U.S. 
“science-based stockpile stewardship and management” program. An 
assessment is also required as to what can and cannot be achieved without 
recourse to nuclear explosive tests. Evidence shows that the U.S. nuclear 
weapon stockpile has already returned to the 1959 level. The U.S. nuclear 
weapon stockpile peaked in 1967 at 32,000 weapons, came down to 22,000 
weapons in 1989 and is now at 10,400 operational weapons, and 13,100 
intact weapons. The current retirement backlog of 2700 weapons will be 
dismantled by the year 2000.
Pending further reductions, the U.S. plans a stockpile of 10,000 
intact weapons under START II. Out of the 10,000 intact weapons, 3500 are 
to be deployed as strategic and 2500 are nondeployed strategic “hedge.” In 
addition, 550 spare warheads to replace warheads removed for disassembly 
inspections will be retained as well as 950 non strategic and 2500 “inactive 
reserve” weapons.
Nuclear Program  Funding
Spending trends have made it clear that funds for nuclear weapons 
have dropped significantly. The overall level of spending on nuclear 
explosives research, development, testing and production has been cut in 
half. In constant fiscal year (FY) 96 dollars, it has been estimated that an 
average eight billion dollars per year has been reduced between 1983-1993. 
There is a projection for an average of dollars 4 billion dollars reduction per 
year between 1997-2002.
In contrast, spending on nuclear weapons research remains high. 
The level of expenditure on the stockpile stewardship and management 
(SSM) program will remain above the cold war annual average for directly 
comparable activities (nuclear weapons R&D, testing, production, and 
stockpile surveillance). On average, 3.6 billion dollars has been spent 
between 1948 and 1990. The SSM is funded at 3.9 billion dollars for FY 
1997. In August 1995, President Clinton pledged dollars 40 billion dollars 
for 10 years to “close the deal” on the comprehensive test (CTB) ban with 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Laboratories.
There are a number of important technical tasks related to stockpile 
management including plutonium pit manufacture, tritium purification,
nonnuclear parts manufacture, weapon assembly and disassembly, and 
plutonium processing and recovery. The tasks of science based stockpile 
stewardship are computer modeling, high explosives R&D, low energy 
implosion physics, and high energy density physics. More specifically, under 
computer modeling, functions would include hydrodynamic codes, neuironic 
codes, and radiation transport. To maintain computer modeling capabilities, 
the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCII) has been approved 
under which one billion dollars has been allocated for new weapons lab 
computing network, including three so called massively parallel processors.
This initiative is to be implemented through three collaborations consisting 
of Livermore-IBM, Sandia-Intel and Los Alamos most likely to be paired 
with CRAY.
Nuclear Testing
High explosive research and testing are undertaken at Los Alamos 
and Lawrence Livermore labs and the Nevada test site. The functions of 
nuclear explosive testing are numerous. It is significant to obtain weapon 
physics data and calibrate design codes and to confirm or disprove designer’s 
calculated performance predictions about the advanced development of new 
designs. It also confirms whether engineering design changes are needed for 
nuclear warhead integration and quantity production. It is also utilized for 
certifying nuclear performance of production-line version of device for 
stockpiling following simulated “stockpile-to-target-sequence” stress testing.
It may confirm or disprove the existence of problems which possibly affect 
nuclear performance and certify fix. Other functions include investigating 
the effects of nuclear weapon effects on military/space systems and 
confirming designer predictions of one-point safety.
Given the above, it is necessary to raise the question as to why the 
U.S. has agreed to stop testing. The high levels of U.S. - Russian nuclear 
explosive testing were primarily driven by the military requirements of each 
side’s nuclear deterrent strategy during the cold war, which escalated into an 
arms race. The “mad momentum” of this race was compounded and 
complicated by internal bureaucratic and institutional factors, which are still 
present in both the countries.
The cold war is over, and the nuclear arms race, if not terminated 
completely, has at least considerably abated. The U.S. defence establishment 
has no current, or currently foreseeable requirement for the production of 
new design nuclear weapons. For technical reasons, many nuclear weapon 
experts favoured a low-threshold CTB. To maintain stockpile confidence, 
many in the U.S. defence establishment would have preferred a test ban that 
excluded tests up to the level required to verify primary conditions required
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for boosting (300-500 tons.) However, this level would have still required 
extrapolation of the test results to certify the final yield in a physics regime 
of considerable scientific uncertainty (i.e., effects of instabilities, mixing, 
boost performance). Such low-yield tests did not represent a significant 
enough improvement over calculated results to justify abandoning objective 
of “zero yield” CTB. The utility of hydronuclear tests (up to four pounds) 
had likewise been rejected on similar grounds, i.e., technical benefits did not 
outweigh political costs.
In asssessing the United States’ SSM program, it should be noted 
that it is still a work in progress. Numerous planned capabilities are yet to be 
demonstrated and may not operate successfully for many years. The purpose 
of improved computing and experimental capabilities is not to design and 
certify performance of new weapons, but to maintain the technical capability 
(including relevant scientific cadre) to do so in the future whether the test 
ban regime breaks down or new threats emerge.
In the meantime, enhanced capabilities will be used to evaluate, 
maintain, and modify components and delivery packages for proven nuclear 
weapon designs retained in the so-called “enduring stockpile.” Two 
alternative interpretations may be made regarding the U.S. agreement to stop 
testing. One is that the U.S. and other nuclear weapon powers no longer 
require nuclear explosive tests to develop new weapons, so they agreed to 
ban nuclear explosions. Another more likely reason could be that the U.S. 
and other nuclear weapon powers no longer have a sufficiently compelling 
political-military requirement to test when balanced against other important 
concerns.
There is one indication that the U.S. has not freed itself from reliance 
on nuclear explosive tests to develop new weapons, which is the 200 million 
dollars per year program to maintain the “readiness” of the Nevada test site 
to resume testing. Assuming a continuing high level of investment in ever 
more powerful computing and experimental facilities, the more technically 
aggressive elements of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex envision that by 
the year 2010, the United States will succeed in integrating 3-D weapon 
design codes that accurately model all phases of a nuclear explosion with 3- 
D CAD/CAM product engineering codes. The objective is to produce a 
“seamless” computer based “virtual weapon” design and “production ready” 
prototyping capability.
In the final analysis, broad political and security factors will continue 
to exert the strongest influence on the emergence of a virtual weapon testing 
capability. Even if this approach might ultimately reach the stage of 
implementation with high confidence (which does not appear plausible at 
this point), if the CTB enters into force and nuclear weapon reductions
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continue on an asymptotic course toward zero, this vision will never be 
realised. Financial support will be cut in proportion to the nation’s reduced 
political and military reliance on nuclear weapons. Political considerations 
will ultimately determine the outcome. For example, engineering 
development and production of subkiloton micronuke weapons, which could 
plausibly be designed and produced as pure fission weapons without testing 
are prohibited by legislative statute (the 1993 Furse Amendment).
The SSM program is far larger than it needs to be as a result of 
political and institutional considerations. As a politically centrist President 
striving to overcome a “weak” image on military issues, Bill Clinton 
essentially needed to buy the assent of the nuclear defence establishment to a 
CTB, rather than seek to defeat it in a headlong confrontation in the 
Congress over the nuclear weapons budget. In 1994, both houses of 
Congress came under Republican control, and control of the national security 
committees passed to senior Republicans with a long history of 
unquestioning support for the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons 
design and production complex, much of it located in their states.
Ultimately, the goals and scale of the SSM program are strongly 
linked to the outcome of fundamental reviews of the future role of nuclear 
weapons in U.S. and international security strategy. A different SSM 
program could emerge, depending on the outcome of such reviews.
SSM Capabilities and Nuclear Nonproliferation
A non-NPT weapon state or nuclear threshold state will be 
concerned about getting four things right: hydrodynamics, neutronics, timely 
initiation of the fission chain reaction and estimation of yield. 
Hydrodynamic behaviour of a device during the assembly phase can be 
predicted by well established computer modeling techniques and confirmed 
experimentally by hydrodynamic testing. The behaviour of implosion 
systems designs with fissile Pu-239 or highly enriched uranium (HEU) cores 
can be investigated at reduced scale to avoid criticality. The full scale 
implosion system designs can be tested with non-fissile cores made of U-238 
or 80 percent Pu-242.
Neutronics during the assembly phase can be calculated using 
publicly available data and computer codes that are the same as, or similar to, 
codes used by the commercial nuclear industry. Neutronic calculations using 
weapon-applicable versions of these codes can be “benchmarked” against 
lab-scale experiments using pulsed reactors and fast critical assemblies. The 
computer modeling of hydrodynamic and neutronic behaviour during the 
disassembly phase is important for accurate yield prediction. Disassembly 
cannot be verified without nuclear testing, or access to historical test data or
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previously verified weapon codes.
Initiation is a process in which fission neutron production rate peaks 
at the time of maximum core compression. The first generation devices are 
likely to be internally (self) initiated, and hence susceptible to exploding 
before the point of average peak compression or maximum criticality has 
been reached. The use of an external neutron source to achieve initiation 
closer to optimal moment will increase yield from the same amount of 
material or allow the use of less material. Establishing best initiation time 
requires carefully diagnosed experiments and calculations to determine the 
time history of core compression.
Accurate yield predictions require verification of the accuracy of 
computational modeling for the disassembly phase of the weapon. It 
requires higher yield testing or access to historical test data and nuclear test 
calibrated codes. Full scale nuclear tests are needed to certify yield of fully' 
engineered devices, improve predictive power of weapon design codes, and 
optimize designs with respect to yield-to-weight and yield-to-volume.
But the suboptimal fission weapon can be developed without nuclear 
explosive testing. Confidence in the ability to achieve substantial yields 
(several tens of kilotons) can be established through the use of 
straightforward theoretical approximations. These relate the fraction of 
material likely to be fissioned to the number of critical masses achieved 
through compression at the time explosive disassembly begins. Such 
approximations can narrow the yield uncertainty for unboosted devices to 
within a factor of two.
On the question of India’s nuclear option, it may be said that the 
design, manufacture, and maintenance of optimized DT boosted, two-stage 
high yield thermonuclear weapons is technically demanding, hugely 
expensive, and requires some level of nuclear explosive testing to verify 
designer choices and the capabilities of predictive codes. The “need” of the 
U.S. for such weapons was nurtured in the mindless momentum of the U.S.- 
Soviet nuclear arms competition and they are not required if the goal is 
simply to deter nuclear weapon use against India by other states pending 
their eventual elimination. A sensible nuclear option for India would be to 
rely on a “threshold” stewardship program without nuclear explosive tests 
that would insure the option of producing an improved pure fission weapon 
should future events so dictate. In the meantime, India could sign and ratify 
the CTB and resume its historic place as a leader in the global efforts to 
reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear arms.
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TECH NOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES

G L O B A L ISA T IO N  AND T EC H N O L O G Y  SH A R IN G
K. Kasturirangan
In modem times, the trend towards globalisation is evident in every 
field such as politics, economy, culture and the science and technology. In 
the political scenario, the end of the cold war has transformed global political 
maps and equations.
On the economic front, a radical transformation has been taking 
place. The result is the shift for several countries in policy from the policies 
of centralized control of production and allocation of resources through state 
planning to market economy. Many countries have been persuing economic 
liberalisation policies in order to integrate into the global economy. In the 
field o f culture, development in modem means of communications have 
assisted in greater exchange of cultural activities among nations.
Finally, the developments in scientific research and the 
pervasiveness of the spirit of science, have been promoting a universal 
outlook. It seeks to spread knowledge for the general welfare of human 
society and for preserving the environment. This spirit promotes 
globalisation of science.
A dvancem ent in Science and Technology
Developments in science and technology (S&T) particularly in the 
fields of transportation, telecommunications and the advent of information 
technology are making progress towards rapid globalisation. In the very 
early days o f industrial revolution, we* find that all factors of production 
played a key role in determining wealth generation capacity. Transborder 
movement of men and materials were constrained by the local political set up 
and also by the means for transportation. In many cases, colonies were used 
to supply material resources and cheap labour.
As the industrial revolution succeeded and industrialisation became 
the engine for creation of wealth and its growth, technology became the key 
factor for economic progress. Capital started flowing across the borders. 
Exploration of markets beyond the domestic markets became a necessity for 
creation of economic wealth. Masteiy over the technology and its 
management became more importnat factors for achieving economic 
progress. The outlook for globalisation of the economy has grown in pace 
with the scientific and technological advances in recent years.
The globalisation of economies has been in turn propelling the drive 
for globalisation of S&T. As diplomatic relations strengthen, international 
trade increases and cultural exchanges enhance, the thrust towards
GLOBALISATION AND TECHNOLOGY SHARING
globalisation of S&T is also increasing.
However, the increasing competition in the economic front will 
increase the tendency for technological protectionism and the road for 
globalisation of S&T is going to be rougher. A further challenge is to ensure 
that such globalisation of S&T will contribute to the social well being and to 
improve quality of life of a large part of world population who are yet to 
advance industrially.
Prerequisites for Globalisation of S&T
Globalisation in S&T demands that the standards are made 
universally applicable. The products and processes should meet the 
requirements of the international market. Scientists and engineers should 
have freedom for international activities. All activities in the chain of 
innovation, namely the discovery, invention, engineering, design, 
manufacturing and marketing should be open to international dissemination 
under a transparent and fair set of regulations. Globalisation implies that all 
new knowledge, inventions and technologies will be available as soon as 
they are developed and they are disseminated beyond national boundaries 
and without regard to the difference in political ideologies. Promoting the 
general welfare of all human kind and their harmonious progress should 
become the key objectives for such a process.
In recent decades, more and more countries have placed emphasis on 
scientific and technological development and have achieved varying degrees 
of success in assimilation of technologies for their development and to 
create wealth. Newly industrialising economies of Asia (South Korea, 
Taiwan, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India) and Latin America 
(Chile and Mexico) are some examples. Many countries, which had a latent 
policy to S&T realise that they will be isolated, and are adopting transparent 
policies.
As the rate of obsolescence of technologies is increasing due to rapid 
developments, the nations which develop new technologies are forced to 
look for quick paybacks. The greater scope offered by world markets 
encourages introduction of the technology into global markets even before it 
achieves maturity. For example, the lead times between scientific 
discoveries or inventions and the practical use are phenomenally low in case 
of several new technologies like bio-technology, computers, communications 
and new materials.
International cooperation in science and technology holds the 
promise of bringing down the costs. Large scale efforts like manned 
exploration, global change research, and development of thermonuclear 
fusion reactors, are some examples of shared efforts. The economic
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imperative o f cooperation can be an important driver for globalisation of 
science and technology.
As multinational enterprises grow, and employ people of various 
countries, scope for globalisation increases through their interactions and 
working together. The increasing opportunities available for continuing 
education and the activities of international organisation and professional 
bodies encourage the globalisation o f science and technology.
Challenges fo r G lobalisation o f S& T
The greatest challenge for globalisation of S&T is the continuing 
concentration o f research and development (R&D) investments. Over the 
decades, we observe that in the industrialised countries, the growth o f R&D 
expenditure was more than the growth rate o f GDP. This was contributed by 
both private and public sectors. However, in global R&D, the share of 
developing countries account for only 6 percent. The remaining 94 percent 
are held by developed countries.
This concentration of R&D and the consequent ability to consolidate 
market position by a few corporations in addition to the growing levels of 
R&D costs, pose barriers of entry for many developing nations to 
successfully use technology for rapid economic growth. The R&D costs for 
bringing new innovations into the market are prohibitive in many cases. 
Only laige firms have this ability. In the field of semiconductors, for 
example, generation of each new process calls for investments on the order 
of a billion U.S. dollars. Hence promoting proper focus for R&D efforts at a 
national level, taking due account of international scenarios, assumes great 
importance.
Phenomenal reductions in technological life cycles pose many 
challenges for globalisation of S&T. As product life cycles decrease, the 
need for technology transfer before maturity of technology is urgent. 
However, there has been less incentive for technology transfer (at early stage 
of life cycle) for fear o f generating competitors and the fear o f rapid 
substitution of products. The preferred mode of several technology 
generating firms is to undertake direct trade in other territories.
Another challenge facing globalisation of science and technology is 
the military use. Traditionally military use attracts engagement o f advanced 
technologies as well as driving the developments o f  technologies. However, 
such uses have also resulted in growing restrictions on transfer of 
technologies, particularly those having dual use potential. Thus new 
technologies reached the markets for civilian use with considerable time lag.
Recent reductions in government support for military programs has however 
encouraged early entry of advanced technologies into the market place.
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The greatest challenge in the globalisation of S&T is to achieve 
fairness in the play of economic interests and to overcome the ill effects of 
concentration of market power by a few, which de facto leads to elimination 
of effective conditions for competition. The development of indigenous 
capabilities in all the participating countries, and cooperative outlook is sine 
qua non for overcoming narrow economic interests. International legal and 
institutional frameworks should continue to be further developed to 
overcome those problems which could damage the prospects for a stable and 
sustainable global economic order.
Globalisation Strategies for Developing States
The question of globalisation has to be approached by each nation 
with a systematic and long term view. For example, economic liberalisation 
should be addressed along with the questions of providing stability in prices, 
appropriate institutional support for legal and financial aspects, and also a 
sound social support system which addresses the removal of poverty and ill 
effects of the transition. The globalisation in science and technology 
requires that close cooperation exists among the universities, industry, 
research institutions and the government. The private sector should be 
provided with roles and incentives for undertaking and supporting research 
and development.
The scientists and technologists should be provided with 
opportunities to participate in the international efforts for economic links so 
that they can integrate S&T aspects. They should also be provided with 
greater opportunities for overseas experience which will help in better 
understanding of the market needs and cultural aspects. An important role is 
also played by the national educational systems in the globalisation. Hence 
the educational system has to be tuned to the needs of a globalised society. 
Greater focus has to be given for the conduct of surveys to identify target 
markets and the technological progress in different countries.
An efficient information network is a pre-requisite for taking 
advantage of the opportunities provided during the globalisation process. 
Increased level of participation in the activities of international organisations 
and appropriate professional bodies will assist in further development of 
human resources. The universities and research institutions should be 
encouraged and supported to have collaborative programs with their 
counterparts in other countries. Participation in international standardisation 
programs is essential for industries to develop products which are acceptable 
internationally. Finally, each country has to pursue multiple forms of 
cooperation including bilateral and multilateral forms, taking into account 
the specific needs and the benefits. All these strategies emphasise that there
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should be a multipronged approach to effectively participate and take 
advantage of globalisation process.
Im portance of Technology Sharing in the Context of Globalisation
Globalisation implies competition at the international level. 
Technology is a key factor for maintaining or gaining competitive positions. 
Technology also plays an important role in the development process. Hence 
technology sharing and transfer at the international level assumes importance 
from the view points of technology suppliers and those who need technology. 
Political and economic factors have been playing a dominant role in 
technology sharing among the nations of the world.
Technology transfer takes various forms depending on the level of 
technological evolution in a recipient country. Typically, it is a step by step 
process which includes initiation and learning phase, internalisation and 
assimilation phase and technology generation phase. During the initiation 
phase, the needs are for acquiring a knowledge of operations (involving plant 
and machinery), and undertaking low level design activities. Hence the less 
formal modes of technology transfer such as acquisition of machinery, 
reverse engineering and technical assistance by original equipment 
manufacturers take precedence over more formal modes of transfer like 
foreign director investment (FDI). For large plants like steel or chemicals, 
turn-key agreements are preferred where technology is delivered in a 
bundled form.
During the phase of internalisation, the needs such as mastery of 
production technology, manufacturing equipment, plant engineering and high 
level design are common. Licencing and FDI are the preferred modes of 
technology transfer.
During the technology generation phase, demands arise for 
sophisticated technologies and even technologies which are yet to achieve 
maturity level, so that they could be subjected to further innovations and 
create greater market opportunities. In addition to FDI and licencing, new 
forms of technology transfer such as joint ventures and strategic alliances 
are resorted to. In the scenario of intense competition among a few strong 
parties, strategic alliance is an effective way of deriving benefits through 
synergy of cooperation and through sharing of efforts and benefits. This 
form of relationship is a response to the compelling technological and 
competitive challenges encountered in the modem era. The strategic alliance 
can be based on the strength and contribution of each party in one or more of 
several aspects such as technological assets, access to large markets, efficient 
manufacturing capacity, speed of delivery or possession of large cash 
reserves.
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The other form of technological and business relationship is the joint 
venture. Although this is practiced extensively, the success depends on 
particular agreements. The mere equity participation of the technology 
holder has not implied success since in many cases such partners did not 
assume equal risks with the other partner. Although rare in the history of 
developing countries, another form of technology transfer is through 
acquisition of high-tech firms in an industrialised country by an enterprise in 
the developing country: Such an acquisition gives substantial opportunities 
for the recipient to upgrade its technological level.
With the heralding of an information era, and with the growing 
desire of technology holders to get quick returns and to capture new markets, 
the foreign direct investment mode has been increasingly adopted by the 
international community. This is increasingly facilitated by the policies of 
liberalisation adopted in many countries and also due to the reduction of 
sponsorship of R&D and procurement programmes by the defence sector in 
advanced countries in the post cold war environment. The annual growth 
rate of FDI in developing countries was 19 percent during the period 1985- 
1990. This rate was much higher than the growth rate in the capital goods 
import which was growing at 11 percent during the same period.
Regimes for Control of Technology and Product Exports
The political and ideological division which dominated the 
international setting after the second world war, along with the security 
perceptions, and the latent economic interests, gave birth to several regimes 
which controlled the export of various technologies and products. In the 
nuclear field, examples of such regimes are the Zangger Committee, the 
London Club, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the insistence on full 
scope safeguards. In the field of dual use technol _-.es, the erstwhile 
Coordination Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the 
more recent Wassenaar arrangements, and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) are well known.
The MTCR, which was promulgated with the objective of restricting 
the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles has however, failed to distinguish 
the need to protect the purely civilian space launch programmes and has 
remained controversial. The undertone of economic interests in the activities 
of such a regime cannot be ruled out. Continuation of regimes with specific 
interest groups imply that there cannot be a global system or global solution 
for technology sharing. However, since the issues related to globalisation of 
economy and the technology sharing are closely linked, efforts should be 
continued to evolve certain common minimum globally applicable 
principles, which take into account the interests of all countries.
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G lobalisation and Emerging Aspects for Technology Transfer
In the wake of globalisation of economies, there are several 
emerging aspects for technology transfer, which need close attention of the 
international community. Firstly, the rapid technological developments have 
reduced the time lag between the scientific discoveries and their market 
application in several fields. Fear of compeitition and of loss of market 
' position have generated greater barriers for rapid dissemination of new 
knowledge generated by science. With a significant and increasing role of 
private sector in the scientific and technological activities, the tendencies to 
restrain access to scientific knowledge and also to promote technological 
protectionism are natural. Appropirate regulatory frameworks to respond to 
such developments in the context of globalisation need to be worked out both 
at the national and international level in order to protect the interests of all, in 
the long and short run.
%
Conclusion
The world is changing rapidly towards establishing a globalised 
society on many dimensions. Of particular interest is the recent movement 
of a significant part of the world population to realise the globalisation of 
economic system with accent on free markets and increased global trade. In 
the context of globalisation of the economy and also in the context of the 
needs of technology for socio-economic development in a large number of 
countries, there has been increasing demands for technology sharing. There 
cannot be a single global solution to this complex issue, given the interplay 
of various interests and the systems that exist in relation to the generation of 
technology, its transfer and applications. However, at the international level, 
efforts should be continued to evolve appropriate regulatory and promotional 
systems, open for participation by all. These should take into account 
interests of all countries and correct any imbalances due to the overplay of 
particular interests of a few members.
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EM BARG O REGIM ES AND IM PACT
R. Chidambaram and V. Ashok
In history, the use of an embargo has always been associated with a 
state o f war. This is also seen in the definition of the word itself, i.e., 
“official suspension of commerce or other activity.” In the nuclear field 
however, embargoes have been in place during peacetime, and, interestingly, 
from almost the time when the destructive power of the atom was first 
unleashed in war.
As early as 1946, the U.S. brought in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act 
which sought control over the dissemination of restricted data and prohibited 
the exchange of any nuclear information with all states, including even its 
war allies, Britain and France. Yet no international agreement on trade 
controls emerged between major suppliers until the mid-1960s. Nuclear 
export control policy remained primarily a national affair, with the U.S. and 
other suppliers like Canada, Australia and France imposing unilateral export 
conditions for nuclear transfers based on their respective national policies. 
The Soviet Union, prior to its dissolution, also controlled its nuclear transfers 
to other Eastern European states. After 1958, the Soviet Union adopted a 
policy of supplying nuclear reactors and enriched fuel to these states on 
condition that spent fuel rods were returned. It also concluded nuclear 
cooperation agreements with other states, most notably in the 1950s with the 
People’s Republic of China.
NPT and its Afterm ath
Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 
1968, which entered into force in March 1970, contain pledges not to 
transfer, seek access to, or in any way assist, the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Article III outlines the International Atomic Eneigy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards to be applied under the Treaty in non-nuclear weapon states, with 
Article m .2  covering safeguards on the transfer of fissile material to such 
states. The Statute of the IAEA states that the Agency “shall seek to 
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and 
prosperity throughout the world.” Likewise, it stated unambiguously the 
“inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop, research, production 
and use of nuclear eneigy for peaceful purposes without discrimination” and 
that all Parties to the Treaty “undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information.” Article IV adds that “Parties to the 
Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or
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together with other states or international organisations to the further 
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
with due consideration to the needs of the developing areas of the world.” 
Sadly, the NPT has been used far more to deny than to provide assistance to 
needy states. Of Article VI, which called for universal global nuclear 
disarmament, the less said the better. The final nail in the coffin of this 
clause was sealed with the indefinite extension of the NPT, perpetuating the 
existing discriminatory system between the haves and the have-nots.
The Zangger Committee (named after its Chairman Professor Claude 
Zangger of Switzerland) comprising 22 states, mostly West European nuclear 
suppliers, began informal meetings in Vienna in 1971 on the exact meaning 
of Article HI.2. In 1973 and 1974, the Soviet Union and states from Eastern 
Europe were included. While France, which was not a party to the Treaty 
did not participate, it did support the substance of the Treaty. The group 
decided that its status was informal, and that its decisions would not be 
legally binding on its members. The Zangger Committee established the 
definitional criteria for source and special fissionable materials and 
equipment or material especially designed for or prepared for the processing, 
use or production of special fissionable material. Agreement was reached on 
two memoranda which were published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/209 in 
September 1974. Memorandum A covered materials, and specified that all 
export of nuclear source or special fissionable materials were to be subject to 
safeguards. Additionally, such material, when exported to, or retransferred 
to, states outside the NPT were to be covered by a nonnuclear explosive use 
assurance.
Memorandum B covering equipment, was composed of a trigger list 
of items, which could be exported or retransferred only if the source or 
special fissionable material produced, processed or used in the equipment or 
material in question was subject to safeguards under an agreement with the 
IAEA. The trigger list included: nuclear reactors and equipment such as 
zirconium tubes and coolant pumps, deuterium and heavy water, nuclear 
grade graphite, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants, and uranium 
enrichment plants. The Zangger Committee has continued to meet bi- 
annually, and conducts its meetings confidentially. In 1978, heavy water and 
deuterium production facilities and gaseous diffusion plants, in 1984 gas 
centrifuge equipment, in 1985 reprocessing equipment and in 1990 gaseous 
diffusion equipment again were added to a consolidated list published in 
1990 as INFCIRC/209/Rev.l. The Zangger Committee began a kind of 
cartelization of the nuclear industry which was formalized and enlarged 
under the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) which followed it.
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The Form ation of the NSG
The NSG, first known as the London Suppliers Group, set up in the 
mid 70s, began the process of compartmentalizing materials, technology and 
equipment. The Group is independent of the IAEA. The NSG initially 
comprised seven major supplier states: the U.S., the Soviet Union, the U.K, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, and Japan (all except 
France members of the Zangger Committee). Its purpose was two fold: to 
integrate France (then a non-NPT State) more closely into global nuclear 
trade controls, and to achieve consensus on further restrictions on their 
nuclear exports.
The NSG decided that two sets of conditions should be attached to 
exports of certain nulcear items. First, the Zangger Committee condition of 
“peaceful use, safeguards, and the retransfer provision” would apply not only 
to the items themselves, but also to the design and knowledge embodied in 
the technology. Second, the physical protection of these items was to be 
agreed to between governments. In addition, suppliers would exercise 
restraint in transferring material (plutonium and enriched uranium) and 
facilities (reprocessing and enrichment facilities), and suppliers would insist 
on the right to veto the reprocessing or further enrichment of nuclear fuels. 
These conditions were published in February 1978 as INFCIRC/254, by 
which time the NSG had attracted seven additional members (all European) 
to make a total of 14. Further additions to the NSG were made in the 1990s, 
when following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia, France and several East 
European states joined it. Currently, the NSG has 31 members, with the 
Republic of Korea seeking entry as the 32nd member.
COCOM and its Demise
Although the Soviet Union and Eastern European states took part in 
the Zangger Committee and the NSG, significant nuclear trade barriers 
administered by the Coordination Committee for .Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM) also existed between the Communist bloc and the west. 
COCOM began operating in January 1950, although discussions for its 
export guidelines had been underway since 1948. COCOM was designed 
orginally by western states to restrict the transfer of militarily significant and 
other sensitive technologies to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. 
There was no treaty establishing COCOM, and it operated in a manner 
similar to the NSG through an informal system of export control guidelines 
which participating states agreed to implement on a national basis. It had its 
organisational headquarters in Paris.
The COCOM export control guidelines were divided into three 
separate lists, the International Munitions List, the International List
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(covering several dual-use items), and finally the International Atomic 
Energy List containing the items in the nuclear field for which transfers were 
subject to review among states participating in COCOM. All three lists were 
secret, but formed the basis of many national export controls. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation led to 
a review by those states subscribing to COCOM (all the members of NATO, 
except Iceland, plus Japan and Australia) of the export control list and 
criteria for technology transfer. This led to changes in some of the lists, 
including the nuclear one and an expansion of the items that might be 
transferred to the former republics of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and 
China. In 1994, COCOM was wound up in favour of a new arrangement, the 
Wassenaar.
National Controls
Several states imposed their own controls over the nuclear exports. 
For example, the U.S. 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) sought to 
permit supply of nuclear fuel to nonnuclear weapons states only if such states 
accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities, do not establish any 
new enrichment or reprocessing facilities under their de facto or de jure 
control and place any such existing facilities under effective international 
auspices and inspection. Existing agreements for cooperation were made 
subject to review on a case by case basis. India is pursuing a closed fuel 
cycle which in our view is not only optimal from our. resources perspective, 
but also from energy resource utilisation point of view. As is common 
knowledge, breeders generate tens of times as much energy as once-through 
cycles. The U.S. stance on reprocessing, and its aversion to civil plutonium 
use appears contrary to the objective of sustainable nuclear energy 
development.
The formulation of the NSG guidelines together with the stringent 
national export control policies of some of the western suppliers led to strong 
criticism being voiced by developing countries in several international 
forums, including the International Conference on Peaceful Nuclear 
Cooperation in Persepolis, the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation, and the 
second NPT conference in 1980. This led to the initiation of two efforts to 
seek a consensus in nuclear trade. The first was the creation of an IAEA 
Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). This tried to establish agreed 
roles for nuclear trade that would both enhance peaceful nuclear cooperation 
and strengthen nuclear nonproliferation. The. second was the 1987 United 
Nations Conference on Promoting International Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy. Both failed due to the attitude of those supplier 




Increasing Prominence of Dual Use Items
The revelations in 1991 about Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme 
and the big role played in it by foreign suppliers (mostly European), 
following the pattern of similar Pakistani activities, showed that procurement 
practices appeared to have changed over time. Rather than seeking items 
contained in the Zangger or NSG List, purchase of dual-use equipment and 
material, and the use of on-site consultants for technology transfer appeared 
to be the new modus operandi. The experience with North Korea which 
followed immediately after this demonstrated also that NPT membership, 
was not a guarantee of adherence to the principles enunciated by the west. 
The two isolated cases of Iraq and North Korea were treated as adequate 
justification for the supplier states to uniformly apply the axe on all, such 
that trade with even the vast majority of nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) 
signatories to the NPT, with bonafide programmes were to be subjected to 
scrutiny, thereby affecting peaceful civilian programmes.
The NSG met again after a gap of 13 years in the Hague in May 
1991 and in April 1992, 27 nuclear supplier countries meeting in Warsaw 
agreed to a list of 67 categories of dual use technologies and materials to be 
controlled. Dual use items were defined by the agreement as having 
legitimate nonnuclear uses, but if diverted, could make a major contribution 
to the nuclear explosive and unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities. 
States subscribing to the new dual use export controls agreed not to transfer 
any of these items to nonnuclear weapon states unless accompanied by IAEA 
or equivalent safeguards. The items included, inter qlia, industrial equipment 
such as spin and flow forming machines that could be used in uranium 
enrichment equipment; materials such as maraging steel, zirconium and 
lithium-6; uranium isotope separation equipment; heavy water production 
plant related equipment; implosion system development equipment; and 
specialist types of explosives and related equipment.
The cartelization which had earlier been referred to as having begun 
informally through the Zangger Committee was thus crystalized. Recipient 
states had no say. Supplier states ensured that they provided whatever 
material, equipment or technology on their terms. Moreover, unlike the 
principles of conventional justice, here one was judged guilty unless proven 
innocent. The system of curbs developed in a way that led to denial of even 
innocuous technology on the specious plea that it could be used for purposes 
inimical to those specified in the NPT. The entire trade regime thus became 
discriminatory, being dictated according to the commercial interests and
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geopolitical strategies of supplier states.
Technology Inhibition Through 93+2 and CTBT
The Iraq and North Korea events had another profound impact in 
that they gave rise in the IAEA of the possibility of so called undeclared 
nuclear activities in countries which have comprehensive safeguards 
arrangements with the IAEA. With this as the focus, the Agency commenced 
discussions on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency 
of the safeguards system under Programme 93+2. The programme has been 
divided into two parts, Part I consisting of those measures which could be 
implemented under present legal authority and Part II comprising those 
measures which would require complementary legal authority. Measures 
under the latter envisage intrusive inspection regimes including 
environmental sampling, access to additional information through 
unrestricted access to any relevant location and explicit support of the United 
Nations Security Council.
By itself, the IAEA safeguards regime did not have any specific 
enforcement mechanism, but such a mechanism is formally considered under 
Programme 93+2. Apart from impinging on state sovereignty, environmental 
sampling for safeguards purposes allows for chemical and isotopic analysis 
of minute samples (as small as 1 0 '^  g) which may be collected within 
declared facilities or at locations away from nuclear facilities. This includes 
water, soil or biota samples that might provide indication of clandestine 
activity. Indeed any place where the Agency’s inspectors suspect the 
presence of “undeclared activity” can be subjected to close scrutiny under the 
Additional Protocol now being contemplated. While limited provisions for 
managed access are under discussion, it is clear that confidentiality of all 
research and development activity being carried out in a country is likely to 
be revealed through such intrusive measures. Such comprehensive 
information would reveal in detail the directions of research and 
development in different areas of nuclear technology, including military uses 
as permitted under the NPT. It would enable advanced countries to block, 
and therefore, inhibit the development of certain technologies in which they 
desire to retain an upper hand through control of strategic and critical 
materials, equipment and technology (both direct and dual use).
Further more, the requirement of no notice inspections and the 
declaration of export and import of material and equipment, information on 
available natural resources, minerals and ores, as well as all activities 
presently being carried out, and those under contemplation would necessitate 
revealing confidential commercial, economic and strategic information 
whose disclosure could be against the national and security interests. Such
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information as may have been obtained by supplier states through national 
technical means (NTMs), satellites, espionage and human intelligence could 
be used to generate reasons for inspections under 93+2 and be utilised to 
apply political and economic pressure. Parallel, though less extensive 
verification measures as contemplated under 93+2 are those being put in 
place under Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) with for example 
environmental monitoring, inspections and access. Many of these provisions 
are likely to have serious impact through inhibiting technology development 
in NNWS. The NNWS are already subjected to fullscope safeguards. By 
further subjecting them to scrutiny under the series of measures 
contemplated under verification for CTBT, they are under double scrutiny. 
On the other hand, the CTBT is irrelevant for NNWS unless they cheat 
through carrying on clandestine activities and also unless the IAEA fails in 
its safeguards operations in spite of stregthening them recently.
However, the continuous monitoring of data under the CTBT 
through on line seismic (primary and auxiliary), hydroacoustic, infrasonic 
and radionuclide stations worldwide together with die capability for 
detection of radioactive noble gas would strengthen monitoring and 
verification capabilities providing information of relevance to 93+2 or 
CTBT, both of which could be used to impose embargoes and sanctions on 
suspected deviant states which are not parties to NPT, especially when such 
information as obtained through on-line stations would be complemented 
and supported by the use of NTMs. The current CTBT has provisions for 
accepting NTMs with the exception of espionage and human intelligence. It 
is our belief and that of many other developing countries that with the flood 
of information flowing worldwide, selectivity, and therefore, discrimination 
is likely to be applied in focusing on certain regions of the world. The NWS 
will exclude themselves from excessive scrutiny through mutual consensus; 
they will not concentrate on those NNWS party to the NPT whom they 
consider friendly to themselves. Instead those states still away from NPT 
which are nuclear capable (India, Israel and Pakistan) and some other states 
like Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea will be the objects of greater 
attention.
India is not directly affected by the strengthened measures proposed 
since it is not signatory to the NPT. However, during discussions on 93+2, 
the involvement of states which have voluntary offer safeguards (such as the 
NWS) and those with facility related safeguards (such as ourselves) has been 
raised under the so called banner of universality. We maintain that this has 
no legal status since by definition, undeclared nuclear facilities have no 
meaning for states which are not treaty bound to declare the nature and range 
of their nuclear activities. Nevertheless, increased access to information
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could enable suppliers to make judgments which could inhibit supply of 
material, equipment and technology, a factor India shall have to guard 
against. With the CTBT text now having been pushed through the UN 
General Assembly, efforts may now be on to commence negotiations on a so- 
called universal, comprehensive and effectively verifiable Fissile Material 
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Of course, the FMCT, like the CTBT, is irrelevant 
for NNWS signatories to the NPT and some other states like Brazil which, 
without signing the NPT have comprehensive safeguards arrangements with 
the IAEA. Very intrusive regimes are likely under such a treaty and our 
approach towards it has to be cautious. Our reaction to this proposal, if and 
when it is made, will, of course, be based on our (altruistic) desire for global 
nuclear disarmament and our national security concerns. Also, if and when 
the FMCT comes into force, there should be no prospective proliferation 
concerns, and therefore no embargo regimes should operate after that date.
The Wassenaar Arrangement - A Successor to COCOM
In July 1996, after three years of intensive discussions, the successor 
regime to COCOM, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies, has been agreed 
to by 33 countries of Western and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, 
the U.S., Canada, Japan and Australia. The Wassenaar Arrangement has two 
lists, a Munitions List and a Dual Use Goods and Technology List. The 
second list has 2 annexes for Sensitive and Very Sensitive items. The Dual 
Use List consists of the following nine categories: advanced materials; 
materials processing; electronics; computers; telecommunications and 
information security; sensors and lasers; navigation and avionics; marine 
technology; and, propulsion technology.
It has been agreed that the decisions on transfers will be the 
responsibility of each participating state and will be implemented on the 
basis of national discretion, but a mechanism for notifying transfers and 
denials has been coordinated. The Wassenaar Arrangement is described as 
an agreement open to all countries, subject to its being a producer/exporter of 
relevant nuclear industrial equipment but stipulations on conformity with 
nonproliferation policies (NPT) and admission of new participants through 
consensus appear to indicate that India is unlikely to be accepted as a party. 
The Wassenaar Arrangement is not a replacement for NSG, despite the fact 
that most of the members of these two groupings are common. Rather, they 
overlap, and in a sense apply a double check, thereby imposing double 
burden, with Wassenaar having a far more detailed and comprehensive dual 
use goods and technology list. It is indeed most ironic that the Wassenaar, as 
successor to COCOM, has included in its midst the very states COCOM was
EMBARGO REGIMES AND IMPACT
72
NUCLEAR COOPERATJON
once targeted against. In the post cold war, supplier states and their 
dependent buyers appear to have made common cause for a greater cartel to 
ensure sustained growth.
Shortcom ings of Dual Use Controls
Though the professed objective of dual use equipment and 
technology denial is to control proliferation, it cannot be disputed that such 
control would go further in retaining the technological superiority of certain 
countries and manufacturers in diverse areas not directly connected with 
atomic energy. Integrated chips, computers, software, telecommunications, 
marine acoustic systems, optical sensors, underwater cameras, lasers, and test 
equipment to check the safety and reliability of such systems are all covered 
under dual use and could be denied for reasons which may not be 
transparent, and may affect development in countries without indigenous 
capabilities or developed country patronage. History bears out that violators 
acquire technology in defiance of such dual use regimes. On the other hand, 
in the fast developing technological world of today, it seems absurd to 
attempt such all encompassing restrictions on the flow of technology and 
equipment. It is grossly unfair to deny certain technologies to developing 
countries merely because these could have a dual use function. We feel that 
such technology should not be denied, as it will keep the developing world at 
a perpetual technological disadvantage to the developed world.
A related question which arises is whether intellectual property 
rights can be attached to equipment or technology subject to embargo. Just 
as we seek to remove the barriers hampering free trade in other areas, we 
must equally seek the free flow and exchange of nuclear technology and 
equipment, especially in areas like nuclear power and safety, and peaceful 
uses, such as in medicine, industry and agriculture. Such transfers should, of 
course, be monitored to prevent diversion to non-peaceful applications. As 
in previous years, we have, this year introduced a draft resolution at the 
Disarmament and International Security Committee of the UN General 
Assembly calling for holding multilateral negotiations, aimed at establishing 
nondiscriminatory guidelines for transfers of dual use technologies.
Low Impact on India
What will be the impact on India of such embargo regimes? Since 
1974, we have been facing some degree of restrictions on imports of 
materials and equipment, as well as for transfer of technology. When we see 
the progress that we have made in these 22 years in different sectors of 
atomic energy, it is clear that the impact on India of such restriction or 
sanctions has been low. It is true that some of the projects then on hand were
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slowed down, and I would be the last person to avoid mentioning the 
considerable hardships that we have, collectively, as a team, gone through to 
accomplish our set goals. Yet, we have done so, proving that even if India 
can be slowed down in the short run, her technical reservoir of competence 
and skill will ensure that she cannot be stopped.
Technology embargo may have been a hindrance, but it has also been 
a motivation for striving for self reliance. We embarked from the beginning 
on a programme of self reliance. That programme was accelerated and 
intensified in the face of the closed doors to cooperation which we faced, and 
indeed, our self reliance and self determination increased due to the obstacles 
faced in developing our own technologies. This is apparent from some of the 
developments we have made indigenously in response to such challenges. 
The Anupam super computer, based on the parallel processing technique, 
with up to 64 computers interconnected by a high speed communication 
system is a typical example. We have recently undertaken the coolant 
channel replacement at RAPS-2 at considerably lower cost and radiation 
exposure than that achieved by the Canadians. For diverse applications, we 
have developed our own software, for intricate nuclear power station design 
as well as start up/shut down operations. We have demonstrated capability 
over the front and back end of the fuel cycle and have just completed our 
third reprocessing plant at Kalpakkam which has already undergone cold 
commissioning.
We have acquired expertise in fuel fabrication for all kinds of nuclear 
fuels, including mixed oxide fuels (MOX). When denied enriched uranium 
oxide fuel for our Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), we went ahead and 
introduced for the first time in the world an indigenously produced mixed 
uranium plutonium carbide fuel for the FBTR which has worked excellently 
so far up to a bumup of 26,000 MWd/tonne. Kamini, a 30 kw mini neutron 
source reactor, which went critical only on October 29,1996, is currently the 
only reactor in the world running on the Uranium isotope fuel. We 
have developed the hydrogen sulphide process for our heavy water plants. 
The list is long and includes requirement for our research and development, 
ranging from lasers and cryogenics to high speed molecular pumps, from 
master slave manipulators to complete chemical plant design. It is perhaps 
the reason the IAEA Director General Hans Blix said a couple of years ago 
in Vienna, “when you think of self reliance, there is no better example than 
Lidia.”
Reverse Flow of Technology
There is also a reverse flow of technology, capabilities, services and 
equipment now experienced. In this sense, India is perhaps very fortunately
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placed in the nuclear field in that, despite being a developing country in the 
economic sense, we are in a position to offer goods and services to match 
those from the developed world. This reverse flow has been apparent in the 
fellowship programmes in advanced areas in the Held of nuclear sciences, 
both bilaterally and under the IAEA’s technical cooperation programmes. 
We also host and participate in a number of seminars in association with the « 
IAEA and with other bodies such as the Candu Owners Group and the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). We have signed a contract for 
export of a modest quantity of heavy water. In 1995, we had gifted some 
environmental stack monitoring equipment to the IAEA laboratories at 
Seibersdorf, Vienna, and this year we have just gifted laser fluorimeters for 
detection of trace quantities of uranium to the same laboratories. The 
equipment would be used for training technicians from developing countries.
We are also prepared to offer research reactors as well as reprocessing 
services, and feel these would find a market when the climate is more 
conducive.
Future Trends
While we have witnessed the rise of controls including those on dual 
use goods and technology over the past few years, there has also been 
considerable interest shown in the Indian nuclear programme by several 
western suppliers, especially in the wake of the slow down of nuclear 
programmes in their respective countries. Clearly, the world is aware that 
there is nothing India cannot do and what we have not done is a reflection of 
our self-restraint rather than our lack of capability.
We are also confident that economic factors will prevail increasingly 
in cooperation in areas of nuclear power and safety, particularly with the 
increasing globalisation of our economy and capabilities of Indian scientists 
and engineers working in the country and outside. In this we must see the 
example of the desire of even the U.S. for cooperation with China. The 
answer lies in economic strength which will lead to adoption of policies of 
appeasement rather than those of denial. In these last few years, we have 
embarked on the road towards a powerful economy and we need to ensure 
we proceed speedily along this path. We currently have ongoing research 
programmes with several countries which are very active. Indeed, one of our 
objectives in recently setting up the Indian Atomic Industrial Forum (IAIF) 
was to provide a platform for cooperation in nuclear energy programmes 
among the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, the Indian industries 
and Department of Atomic Energy but also international agencies, industrial 
groups and organisations.
The winding down of nuclear power programmes in the west is
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complemented by a corresponding increase in such plants in Asia, 
particularly in the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, China and India. Nuclear 
energy is the inevitable option for fulfilling the electric power requirements 
of the.future. The developing countries of Asia, with their large populations 
and present low per capita electricity consumption, need nuclear power more 
than the developed countries for improving the standards of living of people, 
and represent the future focus for growth in the nuclear power industry, a 
factor which commercial organisations in the field of nuclear power can ill 
afford to ignore.
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Brahma Chellaney
Technology controls have a long history. Ancient empires sought to 
zealously safeguard technological innovations, ranging from new tools of 
warfare to fresh discoveries in navigation science and astronomy. However, 
it was only with the advent of the industrial revolution that technology was 
fashioned into an effective political tool to subjugate alien civilisations.
The European states, the first to benefit from the industrial 
revolution, employed superior military strength derived from industrial 
advantage to colonize the world’s ancient civilizations. In other words, they 
employed dual use technology, the main target of export controls today, to 
achieve their strategic objectives. The so-called Third World emerged as a 
technologically and economically backward region because, having been 
colonized by the Europeans, it missed the industrial revolution and even the 
initial post-World War II electronics revolution. More than three quarters of 
the United Nations’ present 185 member states have been independent for 
less than 40 years.
Colonialism was a classic case of the pursuit of economic interests 
through superior military technology. Even today, greater military prowess 
remains crucial to the assertive pursuit of economic interests. The 
geostrategic value of nuclear weapons is evident from the fact that most of 
the major economies today have the protection of a nuclear arsenal.or 
umbrella. Much of Western Europe and other significant economies such as 
Australia, Japan and South Korea are ensconced under the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella. Security is seen as an essential requisite to the pursuit of economic 
goals.
Tightening of Technology Controls
Today, the relationship between industrial technology and militaiy 
technology is closer than ever. Technologies for civilian modernization are 
equally useful for building military power, and vice versa. It is thus 
becoming increasingly difficult to separate civil and military research and 
production. Military products and innovations are relying more and more on 
commercial technologies and items. The United States’ unmatched 
conventional force power projection capability derives mainly from the 
application of commercial advances in the processing and transmission of 
information. It is a big challenge to effectively control technology flow in an 
interdependent world in which the private sector is spearheading the 
advancement of civil and dual use technologies. Moreover, all advanced
technologies today are dual purpose.
In the period after World War II, technology controls, for the first 
time in history, began being fashioned in the form of elaborate, 
institutionalized, multinational structures, backed by national export control 
barriers. After the end of the cold war, the institutional structures for 
technology control are being broadened in terms of their membership. The 
United States has led efforts to tighten and expand domestic and international 
export control mechanisms to limit the diffusion of sensitive technologies, 
and national export controls in western supplier states have also been 
harmonized in recent years.
Why are technology controls being strengthened and expanded after 
the end of the cold war? The termination of the cold war was widely 
expected to yield a peace dividend, promote genuine disarmament and lead 
to the loosening of technology controls. The reality seven years after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall is very different. The opportunities opened up by the cold 
war’s conclusion to build a durable world order pivoted on truly collective or 
cooperative security are being frittered away. The peace dividend remains 
largely elusive and the prospects of comprehensive nuclear disarmament 
remain bleak despite a recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that 
the nuclear powers are legally obliged not only to negotiate in good faith but 
“to achieve a precise result nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.”
The tool of technology control and denial is indeed being sharpened 
to bolster great power interests. To lend legitimacy to the reinforcement and 
expansion of technology controls and to justify the retention of cold war 
doctrines and strategies, it is being argued that the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction has replaced the cold war as the main threat to 
international security. Declaring that the “proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States,” U.S. 
President Bill Clinton in November 1996 extended for tire third straight year 
the “national emergency” regarding such weapons.
It has become an article of faith among U.S. officials and analysts 
that horizontal proliferation is the new threat to American security and global 
peace. No empirical data, however, has been presented to show that such 
proliferation is taking place and is threatening U.S. or world security. 
Nevertheless, the ghost of Iraq continues to be seen everywhere, and the 
Pentagon has even embarked on a “Counterproliferation Initiative” that seeks 
to develop capabilities and technologies to militarily knock out, if necessary, 
facilities of proliferation concern.
The main arms control efforts have been concentrated on making 
“nonproliferation” a respectable and lawful enterprise, erecting new technical
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WASSENAAR GROUP
78
NUCLEAR COOPERATION
barriers to horizontal proliferation and stabilizing deterrence between and 
among the nuclear powers. Treaties such as Intermediate Nuclear Force 
(INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and START n , which 
were products of coldwar surpluses, were designed to safeguard deterrence, 
not undermine deterrence, by eliminating the most vulnerable and 
destabilizing of the weapon systems. It is unthinkable that treaty related 
restrictions would be accepted on the most sophisticated of the nuclear 
weapons, i.e., the submarine based systems, or on the movement of such 
arms through international water and the so called “nuclear weapons free 
zones.”
As arms control is aimed primarily at reinforcing the present status 
quo in the global power structure, new strategies are unfolding to stem the 
diffusion of militarily significant technologies which are also at the cutting 
edge of economic modernisation. These strategies are designed to augment 
the four ways in which the spread of advanced technology is being 
controlled. These methods are:
1. National Export Barriers. The United States has the most 
elaborate and expansive export controls, with overlapping lists of controlled 
goods and technologies. At U.S. urging, the export controls of European 
countries have grown dramatically since the 1991 Gulf.War. The emphasis 
now is on harmonizing the national technology controls among the western 
allies.
2. Multinational Controls. The control lists of goods and 
technologies maintained by the London Club of nuclear suppliers, the 
Australia Group on chemical and biological precursors and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime have all grown since the end of the cold war. 
These controls are also being supplemented with national export barriers. 
For example, the United States has fortified the MTCR controls with its 
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) controls. According to 
Clinton, EPCI “is a catch all control on items that are not in the MTCR 
Annex, but could be used directly in projects of missile proliferation 
concern.”
3. End use Controls. These include on-site monitoring in the 
recipient state.
4. Technology Embargos. These involve denial of all technologies 
classified as sensitive or having potential dual use to the usual suspects, Iran, 
Iraq, North Korea and Libya, which have been branded as “rogue states,” 
“renegade states,” and “pariah states.” Such embargoes often seek to bar the 
transfer of even industrial technology, as exemplified by the 1996 U.S. ban 
on energy sector investments in Iran and Washington’s ongoing efforts to 
persuade European allies not to help develop or upgrade oil fields in Iran.
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Three developments are under way on the technology control front 
as part of the new strategies and initiatives:
i) the regulatory focus of technology controls is changing ominously 
from an East-West perspective to a North-South perspective, with the ex­
target states in the East bloc being brought into multilateral regimes and 
encouraged to set up national export control mechanisms;
ii) all possible dual purpose technologies are being subjected to 
export controls, with the result that all - cutting edge technologies are 
consciously being kept beyond the reach of the targeted countries; and
iii) the principal targets, as acknowledged by western officials, are
now increasingly South Asia (defined as India arid. Pakistan) and the Middle 
East (excluding Israel). - •
In some areas, there has been a loosening pf export controls in 
response to the global diffusion and development of technology. One such 
example is high performance computing (HPC), an area in which the United 
States has been forced to liberalize its export policy in response- to the 
availability of more powerful supercomputers from other suppliers, Including 
India. India has shown how export controls can at 'times be 
counterproductive. After being denied an export license to purchase the U.S. 
Cray XMP-14 model supercomputers, India has built its own supercomputer, 
Param, and exported it to users in Russia, Germany, Canada and Britain.
Under the new American HPC policy, countries have been 
categorized in four tiers. Nations in the fourth tier comprise the alleged 
rogue states and are precluded from all sales. India is in the third tier which 
provides for no licensing requirements for export of computational machines 
with speed up to two billion theoretical operations per second (TOPS). In 
practice, however, the policy works differently. Even as the export of 
supercomputers is being decontrolled to destinations like China and East 
Europe, the United States has “reinforced the burden on exporters of 
satisfying themselves, that exports are not going to destinations of 
proliferation concern,” according to U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency Director John Holum. Washington regards India as a country of 
proliferation concern.
B irth of the W assenaar Arrangement
The establishment of “The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies” 
should be seen against that background. The Wassenaar cartel represents the 
most ambitious multinational venture in controlling trade in dual purpose 
goods and technologies and conventional arms.
The new regime is designed to allow the winners and losers of the
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cold war to jointly tackle potential strategic threats from elsewhere in the 
world, although the western allies will continue to hold closely among 
themselves their most sensitive technology. The cartel began regular 
meetings in September 1996 and its control lists of goods and technologies 
came into force November 1, 1996. The cartel can also be called the Vienna 
Club since it is headquartered in the Austrian capital.
The Vienna Club is modeled on the London Club, the Australia 
Group and the MTCR. These clubs are tied by six common elements.
1. They were bom in secrecy and were publicly unveiled months or 
years later.
2. They continue to lack transparency, functioning behind closed 
doors. The London Club is now considering steps to develop transparency in 
its functioning in keeping with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference.
3. They lack international validating agreements or the sanction of 
the United Nations. Despite the addition of new members in recent years, 
the cartels continue to face international legitimacy problems. The naming 
of the Australia Group in the Chemical Weapons Convention documents and 
of the London Club in the NPT Review and Extension Conference’s 
principles represent back-door efforts to lend international credibility to these 
cartels.
4. They involve some degree of intelligence sharing among their 
members. The London Club did not provide for intelligence sharing until 
fairly recently. Russia’s formal membership in the MTCR was held up for 
several years because the cartel was functioning on the basis of close 
intelligence sharing among its founding members, the G-7 states.
5. They have the same set of core members, many of whom are 
former colonial powers. However, the clubs, which with the exception of the 
Wassenaar Arrangement comprised only western states, today have among 
their members not only ex-East bloc nations but also states such as 
Argentina, South Africa and South Korea.
6. They were set up under U.S. inspiration. The United States 
remains the effective leader of all the cartels.
The Wassenaar Arrangement was stealthily founded on December 
19, 1995, at Wassenaar, a village near The Hague, by 28 countries including 
the former Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls 
(COCOM) partners, cooperating countries, Russia and the Visegrad states.
Its birth was a slow and painful process that began much before COCOM 
was folded up at midnight on March 31, 1994. COCOM was fashioned and 
nurtured for four decades principally to target the East bloc. In June 1992, 
COCOM eased controls on sale of advanced telecommunications technology
81
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WASSENAAR GROUP
to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and invited them 
and other East European nations to join the regime. However, Russian 
reluctance to embrace a cartel that targeted Moscow for decades prompted 
the 17 western members of COCOM to propose a successor regime under a 
new label. When COCOM was dissolved in spring 1994, its controls on 
strategic technologies were kept in force against “countries of proliferation 
concern” by the new forum, and adhoc interim arrangement.
Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin met four times between 
1993-95 to resolve bilateral differences standing in the way of forming the 
successor cartel to COCOM. Among the issues that figured in the Clinton- 
Yeltsin discussions were Moscow’s space and military cooperation with 
India and its pending arms and commercial nuclear power exports to Iran. 
Russia’s decision in July 1993 to break a 75 million dollar contract with 
India to sell cryogenic engine technology came after Clinton personally took 
up the matter with Yeltsin.
The last hurdle in the establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement 
was cleared in mid-1995 when Yeltsin supplemented a pledge not to export 
new weapons to Iran by releasing details of all arms sales pending or in the 
pipeline. The clarification of Russia’s export intentions was then formalized 
under the Chemomyrdin-Gore process, also known as the Russia-U.S. Inter- 
Govemmental Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation. 
This opened the way for the holding of the pre-Christmas founding 
conference of the Wassenaar cartel. That meeting came after several rounds 
of detailed negotiations among the founding members on the regime’s 
structure and controls.
But even after the Wassenaar cartel was founded, its start up was 
delayed by fresh differences, principally between Washington and Moscow. 
The first plenary meeting of the new regime held in Vienna in April 1996 
broke up without agreement on beginning the cartel. The key discord was 
over a U.S. proposed rule against undercutting which Russia was reluctant to 
accept. Under the rule, when one member notifies the others that it has 
rejected a proposed export, then any other member is required to provide 
advance notification to the others if it intends to approve the same export. 
Russia wanted the notification provision to be operative only after delivery 
of the export. Moscow eventually fell in line with the rest of the members, 
opening the path for another plenary meeting in July 1996 to reach 
agreement on implementing the cartel’s lists of controlled goods and 
technologies. By then, the cartel’s membership had swelled to 33.
The establishment of COCOM in 1949 helped usher in the cold war. 
The question that arises today is whether the new Wassenaar cartel will be 
the harbinger of a new kind of a cold war. As then Indian Prime Minister
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P.V. Narasimha Rao said in 1995, we can almost feel the chill of the cold war 
in the air once again.
Significance of the Wassenaar Cartel
The central significance of the Wassenaar cartel is that the two 
former cold war blocs now united in this technology control venture believe 
that the diffusion of technology poses such a threat to their vital interests that 
it is necessary to join hands and impose high-tech controls. There is no 
explanation, however, as to how the potential dissemination of high 
technology to the rest of the world comprising mainly impoverished, 
formerly colonized states could threaten their core interests.
The significance of the Wassenaar Arrangement is self-evident from 
the fact that it has roped in all the important supplier states with the 
exception of China. When discussions on forming the cartel began, China 
was invited to join, with greater access to advanced technology being offered 
as an inducement. The United States unilaterally relaxed restrictions on the 
export to China of a number of high-tech goods, including 
telecommunications equipment, microprocessors, memory integrated 
circuits, digital integrated circuits and field programmable gate arrays and 
logic arrays. However, the cartel’s core founding group later decided on a 
participation criteria that rendered Beijing ineligible, i.e., membership in all 
other technology control regimes and effective national export controls in 
place. China, however, is being encouraged to adhere to the Wassenaar 
syndicate’s guidelines and control lists in the same way it has publicly 
pledged to heed (while covertly violating) the guidelines of the MTCR.
Another significant element is that the cartel’s membership criteria 
has a “critical requirement” that the participating states should already have 
in place “national policies to prevent transfers of arms and sensitive 
technologies for military purposes to the four pariah countries,” according to 
U.S. Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis. In other words, the Wassenar 
Arrangement’s control lists despite public claims to the contrary are not 
directed at the “pariah” states but at some non-pariah nations.
With much of the ex-East bloc coopted into the Wassenaar cartel and 
technology already embargoed to the “pariahs” as a condition of its 
membership, which nations is the regime targetting? If we go by the public 
statements of its guiding functionaries, it is targetting no one. But obviously 
the club was set up to promote the interests of its members through a 
proactive mission. The cartel has no targeted countries named in its 
guidelines but its controlling role nonetheless will squeeze certain nations.
The Wassenaar syndicate, unlike its predecessor regime, COCOM, is 
not to have a permanent list of target countries since it has not been set up to
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mark some specific nations. Rather, it is designed to be a dynamic, evolving 
institution that can cope with new threats as and when they emerge. The 
cartel thus will continually assess regional situations and come up with its 
responses, a sort of revolving door approach. To facilitate reliable
assessments, the cartel provides for intelligence sharing and a permanent 
experts level dialogue on threats to regional and global stability.
Moreover, the Wassenaar Arrangement theoretically is not supposed 
to exercise collective veto on the export decisions of individual members. In 
practice, however, the permanent dialogue process, the rale against 
undercutting and other procedures could make it difficult for an individual 
member to defy the rest of the group. Only time will tell whether the cartel 
matures into an effective technology control institution or is weakened by 
conflicting pulls and pressures from within. The tensions between
commercial and security interests are visible not only between supplier states 
but within their own governments.
Irrespective of how the Wassenaar cartel evolves, certain countries 
are going to be its victims. Which are those? Lynn Davis has acknowledged 
that the syndicate's regulatory focus will be on “regions of potential 
instability, such as the Middle East and South Asia.” South Asia is being 
cited in U.S. policy as the area of greatest proliferation concern since it is 
home to two of the three nuclear threshold states. The United States, of 
course, has an complaisant, indeed cooperative, policy toward the third 
threshold state, Israel.
Implications for India
What are the implications for India of the formation of the 
Wassenaar cartel? For India, already pursued by the other cartels as a key 
target and confronting additional national export control barriers erected by 
the advanced industrial states, the Wassenaar regime holds important 
implications. While it has dramatically opened up its domestic market to 
Western goods and services, India faces shrinking access to high technology. 
The new cartel’s secret list of controlled items is believed to mirror the 
COCOM controls on microelectronics, material processing, high- 
performance computing, marine technology, sensors, advanced materials, 
propulsion systems and other strategic goods and technologies.
The implications for India are also evident from the cartel’s “no­
undercut” rule and from Russia’s inclusion in it. The rule against 
undercutting means that if a request for an export licence is rejected by one 
member, it is likely to be spumed by the other 32 members as well. India, 
therefore, will have to proceed prudently before signaling interest in 
importing a controlled item or technology.
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It remains to be seen how India’s strategic cooperation with Russia 
will be affected by a regime that theoretically is not supposed to exercise 
collective veto on the export decisions of its individual members. Although 
a member of the London Club, Russia is currently negotiating to sell two 
VVER-1000 commercial nuclear power plants to India without demanding 
“full-scope” safeguards as mandated by the Club’s revised guidelines. The 
negotiations reportedly are at an advanced stage, although it is puzzling why 
India, forgetting the lessons of the bitter Tarapur dispute arising from its 
dependency on external fuel and spare parts supplies, should be interested in 
importing old fashioned reactors.
In the past while transferring arms production know-how under 
licence, Moscow effectively blocked reverse engineering by supplying only 
fabrication relevant drawings and specifications to India. Also, by its 1993 
annulment of the cryogenic engine technology contract, Russia has shown 
itself to be an unrealiable supplier even when not in a cartel.
India can only blame itself for coming under growing pressure on the 
technology front. For three decades since starting to produce plutonium, it 
has not been able to make up its mind on the nuclear issue. While nuclear 
profligate China is courted by all cartels, nuclear abstinent India is targeted 
by them. The marking of India by technology control regimes is proof of the 
fact that the country’s unparalleled nuclear self-restraint has won it no 
international admiration and only brought it under greater external pressure. 
Meanwhile, India’s security challenges have been exacerbated.
The new cartel is thus a reminder of India’s mounting costs of 
indecision. It also exposes the vulnerability to external pressure of India’s 
conventional defence posture, heavily dependent on arms imports and bereft 
of the resources to sustain conventional modernization. The biggest lesson 
the new regime can teach India is that it cannot secure its future with solely a 
conventional force posture.
India’s problems are being compounded by the fact that it is 
pursuing conflicting economic and foreign and defense policies. While 
economic reforms seek to integrate India with the western driven global 
economy, the country’s political stance mocks the west’s strategic panorama 
and security order. India needs to blend its political and economic positions 
into a harmonious, long-term national vision. Until it does so, it will 
continue to incur rising costs even as it continues to twiddle its thumbs on 
the nuclear issue.
Conclusion
Technology controls are principally aimed at preserving the military 
and economic interests of the leading powers and their allies. These interests
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include direct or indirect security threats, market access for selling goods 
and services, cheap imports of oil and other raw materials, favorable trading 
rules, and preventing the rise of regional hegemons. In the post cold war 
years, new barriers to trade in technology are being erected even as import 
and investment barriers are being dismantled and new economic 
opportunities are being availed of in countries such as India.
The new Wassenaar cartel is part of the growing consensus and 
cooperation between the former cold war antagonists on controlling the 
diffusion of technology that could potentially impinge on their interests. The 
“rogue-states doctrine” has come handy to justify new technology controls 
although the real intended targets of such controls are different.
The Wassenaar syndicate will impose significant costs on certain 
countries, although its long term viability and effectiveness will depend on 
continued consensus and cooperation among its partners. While there will be 
growing demands for a shift to transparent and internationally validated 
policies on technology control, the present national and multinational export 
control mechanisms will continue to be strengthened so long as the current 
security order holds. However, if NATO and the U.S.-Japan security treaty 
crumble, the present technology control system will also collapse.
While history bears testimony to the long term ineffectiveness of 
technology control strategies, countries that will have to bear significant 
short and medium term costs could lower those costs by pursuing a holistic 
approach to national security, developing independent assets and 
harmonizing their defense, economic and foreign policies with each other 
and with an overall national strategy.
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N U C LE A R  PO W E R  D EV ELO PM EN T: T H E  SO U TH  
K O R EA N  EX PE R IE N C E
Hong, Jang-Hee
In modem times, electricity has contributed greatly to the 
development of civilization and the promotion of human health and 
longevity through many applications in medicine, agriculture and industry. 
Nuclear power is providing an ever-increasing percentage of the world’s 
electrical energy and has contributed to a stable supply of electricity as well 
as environmental conservation by greatly decreasing the emissions of carbon 
dioxide by fossil generation.
Historically, Korea has imported more than 90 percent of its total 
energy requirements because indigenous energy resources are scarce. 
Because of this, and the oil shock in the 1970s, Korea committed itself to a 
policy of nuclear power development as part of a national strategy to acquire 
alternate energy sources. Through the expansion of our nuclear power 
program, our country has overcome chronic power shortages, which lasted 
into the 1970s. Nuclear power generation has played a key role in the 
economic development of Korea by providing long-term stability in our 
electric power supply system.
Status of Nuclear Power In Korea
The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), is the sole electric 
utility in Korea. Since the beginning of commercial operation of first nuclear 
unit, Kori unit 1 in April 1978, KEPCO has achieved rapid growth in nuclear 
power development.
Korea now has eleven operating nuclear units including ten 
Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) and one CANDU. The total capacity of 
these eleven units is 9,616 MWe, or 28.9 percent of country’s total installed 
capacity. The nuclear power generation in 1995 reached 67 billion KWh or 
36.3 percent of the country’s total electrical generation.
The latest unit is Younggwang unit 4, a 1,000 MW unit, which was 
constructed as a part of the- national nuclear technological self-reliance 
program. Younggwang unit 4 went into commercial operation in January 
1996. Younggwang units 3 and 4 were awarded the 1995 “Project of the 
Year” award by "Power Engineering International” magazine for their 
excellence in design, construction, and operation. Seven additional units, 
consisting of four PWRs and three Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors 
(PHWRs), are under construction, and two PWR units are in the planning 
stage.
NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT: THE SOUTH KOREAN EXPERIENCE
The performance of Korean nuclear power plants has shown 
remarkable improvement in recent years, and compares favorably with the 
rest of the world. For example, in 1995 the average capacity factor of 
Korean nuclear plants was 87.3 percent, while the world average was 71.6 
percent. It has been over 84 percent for the last 5 years.
. This remarkable achievement is the result of well coordinated 
operations and maintenance efforts. While maintaining plant safety as the 
top priority, KEPCO has made every effort to improve plant capacity 
factors, which has resulted in improved plant reliability. These efforts 
included adopting extended fuel cycle periods and working diligently to 
shorten refueling outage durations. The resultant is the accumulation of its 
own operating experience and technology, as well as information exchanges 
with nuclear industries worldwide.
Table 1
Nuclear Power Plants in Korea
Units Reactor Capacity
Manufacturer Commercial
Type (MWe) Reator T/G Operation
#1 PWR 587 WH GEC Apr. 1978
Kori #2
I t 650 i i i i Jul. 1983
#3 II 950 i t l i Sep. 1985
#4 II 950 i i i t Apr. 1986
#1 PHWR 678.7 AECL NEI Parsons Apr. 1983
Wolsung #2
« 700 AECL/KHIC KHIC/GE (Jun. 1997)
#3 n 700 II i t (Jun. 1998)
#4 i i 700 M i i (Jun. 1999)
#1 PWR 950 WH WH Aug. 1986
Young-
#2 I t 950 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE Jun. 1987
#3 i i 1000 l l l l Mar. 1995
gwang #4 t l 1000 «l l l Jan. 1996
#5 i i 1000 i f l i (Jun. 2001)
#6 U 1000 l l l i (Jun. 2002)
#1 PWR 950 Framatome Alsthom Sep. 1988
Ulchin
#2 i i 950 «i i i Sep.1989
#3 n 1000 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE (Jun. 1998)
#4 i r 1000 1 i t (Jun. 1999)
( ): Under construction
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Long Term Power Development Plan
It is expected that the annual growth rate of the demand for 
electricity in Korea will average 8.5 percent between 1995 and the year 
2000. The average growth rate from 1995 to 2010 is expected to be 5.9 
percent per annum. As a result, the power development program of 1995 
stipulates the addition of new generating facilities of some 47,367 MWe by 
the year 2010. Among them, 17,713 MWe will come from nuclear energy.
In the long term nuclear power development plan, the Korean 
standard nuclear power (KSNP) plant and the Korean next generation reactor 
(KNGR) plant will be the major options, and 900 MWe PHWRs will be 
alternative nuclear power sources. The KSNP plant is a 1,000 MWe PWR 
unit and the KNGR plant is a 1,300 MWe PWR. When the program is 
completed, the total installed power capacity should be 79,551 MWe.
The current capacity ratio between nuclear, fossil [coal, oil, and 
liquified natural gas (LNG)], and hydro sources is 29:62:9 respectively. This 
ratio will be 33:59:8 in the year 2010. The share of electricity produced by 
nuclear power will increase to 46 percent in 2010 from the current level of 36 
percent.
Table 2
Long Term Power Development Program
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Technology Development
Nuclear power history in Korea can be divided into three stages. 
During the first stage, nuclear power plants were constructed on a turn-key 
basis. In turn-key construction, the reactor vendors were responsible for the 
entire project, from design, engineering and construction to the startup and 
turnover of the plant to the owner. The first three nuclear units were built on 
this turn-key basis.
In turn-key contracts, the opportunities for technology transfers were 
very limited. Also, the participation of domestic companies were limited to 
site preparation work. In other words, Korean companies participated as 
subcontractors of foreign contractors to provide small portions of field 
design, equipment supply and construction. In order to develop a stable 
energy infrastructure that was less reliant on foreign technology, it was 
widely recognized that Korea should become as self-reliant as possible in 
nuclear power technology.
In the second stage, KEPCO took responsibility for project 
management along with the direct procurement of balance of the plant 
equipment. Contracts for supplying Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS), 
Turbine Generator (T/G), and engineering services were made with foreign 
contractors. Korean contractors took responsibility for site construction, 
while other Korean companies were strongly encouraged to expand their 
roles in engineering services and equipment supply. Six units of 950 MWe 
were constructed under this approach, which significantly strengthened 
Korea’s capability to construct nuclear power projects using domestic 
resources.
The third stage of nuclear power development started with the goal 
of finalizing the nuclear technology self reliance program. This program has 
been in effect since the construction of Younggwang units 3 and 4, with 
Korean industries as prime contractors. KEPCO has been in charge of 
project management and technology transfer. Several other domestic 
oiganizations have participated in plant design, construction and 
management, with assistance from foreign subcontractors. All Korean 
organizations and entities which have participated in the nuclear power 
program have improved their capabilities through technical on-the-job 
involvement in all disciplines of nuclear power technology.
Additionally, KEPCO has pursued the standardization of a nuclear 
power plant design, pursuing technological self-reliance and localization. 
KEPCO has developed the design basis for a KSNP plant, reflecting 
operating experience from existing nuclear power plants and the proven 




The commercial operation of Younggwang units 3 and 4 signified the 
beginning of a new era of technological self-reliance in Korea’s nuclear 
industry. The Younggwang units will serve as basic models for the 
development of the KSNP. The KSNP plant design is now applied to the 
construction of Ulchin 3 and 4 and Younggwang 5 and 6. It will be also 
applied to subsequent PWRs, including the two units in North Korea, until 
the development of the KNGR.
In 1992, the Korean government and KEPCO launched the KNGR 
project to develop a standardised advanced light water reactor based on 
previous experience acquired through the KSNP’s design and technological 
self reliance program. The KNGR project’s goal is to complete a 
standardized KNGR design by February, 2000. This project will be applied 
to new nuclear projects which are anticipated to begin operation in 2007.
Developing a new design for nuclear power plants requires a great 
deal of resources and experience, and an integrated project has been 
organised to maximize all experience and technology shared within Korea’s 
nuclear industry. The KNGR design will meet the enhanced safety 
requirements and economic goals of future nuclear power plants in Korea, 
particularly with regard to investment protection and accident prevention.
International Cooperation
By joining several owners groups set up by utilities operating and 
constructing the same type of reactors, KEPCO is continuously making 
efforts to improve plant safety and availability. KEPCO has been affiliated 
with international organizations such as the Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(WANO), in order to exchange information in the nuclear field. KEPCO is 
also participating in various international cooperative activities for the 
promotion of nuclear energy development through the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and inter-governmental nuclear cooperation agreements.
In addition, KEPCO has made technical cooperation agreements 
with thirteen foreign utilities or nuclear organizations from eight countries to 
promote technological development, information exchanges, and training. 
Based on the agreements’ frameworks, various cooperative activities are 
being executed, including periodic meetings and regular exchanges of 
information.
Based on KEPCO’s accumulated technology and international 
confidence building through its success in providing local electricity, 
KEPCO is now expanding its operational sphere to include the global 
community. Also KEPCO is laying the foundation for global operations in 
the Asian region, where the demand for electricity will increase rapidly.
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In December 1993, KEPCO signed its First international contract for 
engineering services for the maintenance of Guangdong nuclear power plant 
in China. In February 1995, KEPCO signed a memorandum of 
understanding with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) for a 
technical and economic joint study for the construction of nuclear power 
plants in China.
This year, KEPCO made an agreement with the Chinese government 
for a joint study on the constmction of Shandong Haiyang Nuclear Power 
Plants, and also provided Quinshan Nuclear Power Company (QNPC) with 
consulting services for the contract between QNPC and AECL in Canada for 
the Quinshan Phase III project in China. Korea is stepping up its efforts to 
build a cooperative relationship with the Asian countries in various Fields for 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. KEPCO is also pursuing cooperative 
joint ventures with advanced foreign suppliers such as ABB-CE in the USA 
and AECL.
Conclusion
Nuclear power has contributed greatly to diversifying energy 
resources, lessening dependence on energy import, and improving 
environmental conservation in Korea.
Considering the current energy situation, Korea will continue on the 
chosen nuclear power path. KEPCO will make every effort to ensure safer 
and more economic nuclear power plants through technological development 
and international cooperation programs. With much experience accumulated 
over the last two decades, Korean industries are now ready to contribute to 





The total energy consumed in India, both commercial as well as non­
commercial form per capita is around 380 KgOe. Forty percent of the energy 
(non-commercial) is derived from bio-fuels, such as, fuel wood, crop residue 
and animal waste. Thus the primary commercial eneigy per. capita 
consumption is about 235 KgOe. The eneigy demand has grown at about 9 
to 10 percent in past decades and is expected to grow further at a rate of 6 to 
7 percent per year up to 2020,
The India’s population has grown from a mere 300 million at the 
time the country gained independence to 940 million (1996) and with the 
projected growth rate, it is expected to double by 2027 and attain 
hypothetical stationery level o f 1880 million. India has made rapid strides in 
capacity addition. The installed capacity has risen to 86,000 MWe from a 
mere 1400 MWe at the time of independence.
The present installed capacity is about 86,000 MWe (utility and 
nonutility) constituting thermal 73 percent, hydel 25 percent and nuclear 2 
percent. The country's per capita electricity consumption is 310 kwh, which 
is veiy low, and is 40 times less than that of Latin American countries and 8 
times less than that of world average. As per the projection made by various 
agencies based on certain assumptions, an installed capacity of about 
400,000 MWe will be required by the year 2020. However, a minimum 
capacity of 200,000 MWe is required to be set up by the year 2020, for 
maintaining sustenance at present levels.
Energy Resources
India is poorly placed in terms of world energy resources. While 16 
percent of world population lives in India, only 0.6 percent of oil and about 
the same portion of gas reserves exist in the country. However, India is 
endowed with 6 percent o f coal reserves of the world. India is a net importer 
of eneigy. As per the present projections the proven reserves of coal are 
expected to last for 100 years. The oil and gas would last for 24 and 23 
years, respectively. Moreover, oil, gas and coal also have nonenergy uses.
The hydel and coal reserves are concentrated in certain regions of the 
country.
Based on the uranium resources available in the country, it will be 
possible to build a maximum of about 10,000 MWe of Pressurised Heavy 
Water Reactor (PHWR) capacity. However, by adopting the fast breeder
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percent of world population lives in India, only 0.6 percent of oil and about 
the same portion of gas reserves exist in the country. However, India is 
endowed with 6 percent of coal reserves of the world. India is a net importer 
of energy. As per the present projections the proven reserves of coal are 
expected to last for 100 years. The oil and gas would last for 24 and 23 
years, respectively. Moreover, oil, gas and coal also have nonenergy uses. 
The hydel and coal reserves are concentrated in certain regions of the 
country.
Based on the uranium resources available in the country, it will be 
possible to build a maximum of about 10,000 MWe of Pressurised Heavy 
Water Reactor (PHWR) capacity. However, by adopting the fast breeder
NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE
technology, it is possible to build a nuclear power capacity of about 300,000 
MWe by using vast resources of 360,000 tons of thorium.
As the projected demand is considerably high, there is a need to 
diversify energy resources. However, nuclear power will have to play an 
increasingly important role in long term energy management. An installed 
capacity of about 10 percent by the year 2020, i.e. 20,000 MWe should be 
added by nuclear power.
India’s Nuclear Power Programme
Indian nuclear power programme commenced with the construction 
of Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS-1 and 2) with 2 x 160 MWe (present 
capacity) Boiling Light Water Reactors (BWRs), using enriched uranium as 
fuel and light water as moderator and was set up in 1969, on a turn-key basis 
by General Electric Company. These two units were set up essentially to 
demonstrate the technical viability of operating them within the Indian 
regional electric grid system, which was at that time relatively small. These 
units also helped us to gain valuable experience in operation and 
maintenance of nuclear power plants. After more than twenty five years of 
safe and successful operation, these reactors are still in service, providing 
much needed electricity to the western grid.
From the very beginning, as a long term strategy, the nuclear power 
programme formulated by Dr. Bhabha, embarked on a three stage nuclear 
power programme linking the fuel cycles of PHWR and Liquid Metal Fast 
Breeder Reactor (LMFBR), was planned for judicious utilisation of our 
limited and low grade (less than 0.1 percent U3O8) uranium ore (78,000 tons) 
but vast thorium resources. The emphasis of the programme was self 
reliance and thorium utilisation, as a long term objective. India has selected 
PHWR, because of several inherent advantages. PHWR uses natural 
uranium as fuel, natural uranium being easily available in India, helps cut 
heavy investment on enrichment, as uranium enrichment is capital intensive. 
Another reason is that the natural uranium requirement for PHWR is the 
lowest and plutonium production is highest. Finally, the infrastructure 
available in the country was suitable for undertaking manufacture of 
equipment for PHWR Reactor.
The three stages of India’s nuclear power programme are:
Stage-I envisages construction of natural uranium, heavy water 
moderated, PHWRs. Spent fuel from these reactors is reprocessed to obtain 
plutonium.
Stage-II envisages construction of Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) 
fueled by plutonium produced in Stage-I. These reactors would also breed 
U-233 from thorium. It is also planned to develop an Advanced Heavy
96
NUCLEAR COOPERATION
Water Thermal Reactor (AHWR), as an extension of Stage-I PHWR 
programme. The AHWR, using a Pu-239 enriched uranium fuel in the driver 
(booster) zone and U-233 enriched thorium fuel in the driven zone, would 
generate a large part of its energy output from thorium through fission of 
insitu bred U-233.
Stage-Ill would comprise power reactors using U-233/thorium as
fuel.
In order to be self-reliant in the field of nuclear power generation, the 
Department of Atomic Energy, opted for “CANDU” technology in 
collaboration with the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, and commenced 
construction of a power station comprising two units of 220 MWe at 
Rawatbhata in Rajasthan in 1964. The CANDU technology involved the use 
of natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as moderator. To achieve self 
sufficiency in this field in the long run, the Department of Atomic Energy 
established facilities for fabrication of fuel and zirconium alloy components, 
manufacture of precision reactor components and production of heavy water. 
Momentous efforts were put in to develop manufacturers in the country to 
produce components like calandria, end shields, steam generators, fueling 
machines, nuclear pumps and other critical equipment required for setting up 
of nuclear power stations, conforming to international nuclear standards. 
Development of world class manufacturing facilities in public and private 
sector organisations was achieved.
The Rajasthan units were followed by two more units at Kalpakkam 
near Madras. Thus, the first stage program with short term goals of 
complementing generation of electricity at location away from coal mines 
progressed steadily. The erstwhile Nuclear Power Board was incorporated as 
Nuclear Power Corporation in 1987 with an aim to accelerate the first stage 
of the nuclear power programme, by having access to finances from the 
market.
With the evolutionary changes taking place with the development of 
the nuclear power plants to meet seismically qualified equipment and 
systems coupled with new safety criteria, improved designs were developed 
and implemented at the Narora Atomic Power Plant (NAPP) in Uttar 
Pradesh. The 220 MWe design was also standardised. The innovation and 
improvements implemented at the nuclear power plant involved considerable 
efforts in research and industrial infrastructure in the country. India had to 
achieve this by itself in view of various embargoes it faced and still faces in 
several technologies concerned with nuclear power.
The successful commissioning of Narora Atomic Power Station 
(NAPS) established total capabilities for design, construction, fabrication of 
equipment, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants in India. In
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the process, a good industrial infrastructure has been created in the country 
for nuclear power programme. Self-reliance has been established in the 
reactor technology in all its aspects. Subsequent to Narora, two more atomic 
power stations at Kakrapar have been built and commissioned in the shortest 
possible time, using the indigenous technology. By successful 
commissioning of KAPS, Kakrapar, it was once again demonstrated that 
India had matured in this technology and is fully capable of exploiting it. 
This also established nuclear power as a safe, environmentally benign and 
economically viable source of power generation, its cost comparable with 
coal based thermal plants.
With the second unit in KAPS at Gujarat, achieving commercial 
operation from September, 1995, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India 
Limited has attained an installed power capacity of 1840 MWe. Presently, 
four units of 220 MWe, namely, Kaiga-1 and 2, near Karwar and RAPP-3 
and 4 in Rajasthan, are in the advanced stage of construction.
Enhancing Growth
With a view to augmenting the growth of nuclear power and PHWR 
system, and also eventually realise economies of scale, it was necessary to 
design a larger PHWR system, and the 500 MWe PHWR was evolved to 
fulfill this need. The design for 500 MWe is ready, and is well set to proceed 
with the construction of 500 MWe PHWR units, with the first units at 
Tarapur. Sites for setting up of 6 X 500 MWe (PHWR), (4 units at Rajasthan 
and 2 at Tarapur) and 4 X 220 MWe (Kota, Rajasthan), have been cleared 
and advance action for developing infrastructure and procurement of long 
delivery items has been taken up.
The nuclear power programme in India has addressed all aspects that 
are of concern to the public which mainly relate to safety, and management 
of high level and long lived radioactive wastes. Safety standards followed in 
nuclear installations are high and generally in line with that of international 
norms. All the technical aspects associated with the handling of the wastes 
have been addressed.
Both the old (Tarapur, Rajasthan and Madras) and new generation 
nuclear power stations (Narora and Kakrapar), have performed very well 
attaining cumulative life time capacity factor near to normative value and 
selling power at competitive rates. Recently, the nuclear power plants 
crossed the generation of one lakh million units mark. The 120 reactor years 
of operating experience has been free of any incident leading to release of 
radioactivity into the environment. While operating these plants, a number 
of challenging maintenance activities have also been handled successfully by 
developing indigenous technology.
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A beginning has been made for the second stage of nuclear power 
program with the setting up of a Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) at 
Kalpakkam, and recent commissioning of a 30 KW research reactor 
“KAMIN1,” which uses uranium 233 as fuel. It is planned to set up one unit 
of 500 MW(e) prototype FBTR, and its design is in progress.
India has also mastered fuel cycle technologies, from mining to 
fabrication of natural uranium fuel, fabrication of enriched uranium fuel, 
reprocessing technology, and fabrication of plutonium and thorium based 
fuel required for the future program. All the technological aspects related to 
short term and long term storage of nuclear waste have been appropriately 
addressed. The related waste management facilities have also been 
satisfactorily developed.
To summarise, the concerted efforts put in by Department of Atomic 
Energy (DAE) and its constituent units together with Indian industries and 
institutions have led to development and full capabilities to design, 
manufacture equipment, construct, operate and maintain nuclear power 
plants. Today, India is among the select band of few countries of the world 
who have developed such capabilities. India’s nuclear power programme has 
now matured as a safe and economical option for not only meeting the 
country’s power demand, but also can embark on exporting the technology, 
and it is poised technically for an accelerated pace of growth.
Notwithstanding the indigenous developments, the light water 
reactors have been the mainstay of nuclear power programmes in most 
countries. These were offered as possible international projects in the past. 
Presently, India is considering the offer by Russia for two 1000 MWe 
VVERs to be built by 2008-2009. Similar additions to our nuclear power 
programme in terms of additional LWRs of advanced designs from 
.international projects can be considered to augment nuclear power 
programme in the coming decades, assuming that the terms of offer are 
appropriate to the Indian context.
Problems Confronted
In most countries, development in the nuclear power sector have 
been achieved by international cooperation supported by funding credit. 
However, the innovations and improvements incorporated by India in its 
standardised 220 MWe PHWR (Narora onward) involved considerable 
efforts in research and development, as well as technological improvements 
in the industrial infrastructure in the country due to various embargoes. It is 
because of this that earlier plants took somewhat longer periods of gestation. 
India is also facing similar difficulties in developing technologies for in- 
service inspection, life extension programmes and spares for imported plants.
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India is in a position to develop all related technologies and recent coolant 
channel removal work from Unit-2 of Rajasthan, within a reasonable time 
and manrem consumption, has amply demonstrated our capabilities.
Nuclear power, which has proved to be a cleaner source of power 
and is not associated with emission of any harmful gases associated with 
global wanning and acid rain, is expected to play a significantly larger role 
in meeting electricity demands. It is worth mentioning that nuclear power 
generation in any part of the globe will not only serve that region, but should 
be considered as an essential element in the global energy policy.
Programme Needs
The country’s nuclear power programme has not grown due to the 
financial crunch. Unlike other infrastructure, proposals to set up nuclear 
plants with foreign technology and soft term loans from the international 
financial institutions, is not available for the nuclear sector due to technology 
regime controls. Financial borrowings from the domestic market are for a 
limited period of five years only. It is too short a period considering the 
gestation period for power plants, even at the international level. This also 
leads to a vicious circle where further borrowing becomes inevitable to pay 
the previous debts, especially, when new capacities are to be added. For a 
nuclear power station, it takes 10 to 12 years to repay the loans after 
commencement of operation of plants. Long term financing from the 
pension fund / provident fund, and similar such funds, should be considered.
So far, nuclear power has been owned and largely funded by the 
Government of India, with limited finances from the public, in the form of 
short term maturity period bonds. The programme has been implemented by 
the Nuclear Power Corporation (NFC) and Department of Atomic 
Energy(DAE). The nuclear power programme in India could not grow at the 
desired pace due to the financial crunch and limitation of borrowing money 
from the public. However, in view of the larger role which nuclear power 
has to play in the future, it has become imperative to consider various other 
options and possibilities of implementing the programme.
The Indian Atomic Industrial Forum (IAEF), an association of NPC, 
DAE and its other constituent units, nuclear industries, R&D organisations, 
and consultancy and financial institutions, has been launched recently with a 
prime objective of working on various options for accelerated 
implementation of the nuclear power programme. Various options which can 
be considered are:
a) Loans from industries in the form of supplier’s credit
b) Equity participation from private parties, both Indian and foreign
c) Joint ownership, with NPC/DAE being responsible only for the
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nuclear island of the project and the entire conventional and utility system 
resting with the other partner.
d) Entire project management together with (c) above, and further 
operation of the plant with similar areas of demarcation.
The Indian Atomic Industrial Forum would also establish and 
enhance coordination with the developing and developed countries in the 
areas of nuclear science, technology and power by providing mutual 
cooperation, and technical assistance. The Forum would also establish and 
maintain close contact with various international agencies and industrial 
groups and organisations engaged in similar activities, and with countries 
already having a nuclear power programme or planning to have one.
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C O M M E N T S O N  N U CLEA R PO W E R  D E V E LO PM EN T
IN  JA PAN
Takao Fujie
In June 1994, the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan formulated 
and issued its new long term programme for research, development and 
utilization of nuclear energy. First conceived in 1954, the policy has been 
revised seven times in order to take stock of developments and changing 
energy circumstances. The last one was issued in 1987.
The latest policy statement is designed with a view toward global 
society in the 21st century and the role that nuclear energy may play. Its 
assumption is that given increases in world population, energy consumption 
and resource constraints, along with environmental problems and 
international movements, nuclear energy is capable of significantly 
contributing to sustainable global development. The programme generally 
outlines the course for Japan to follow up to 2030 and treats in greater detail 
the requirements for the period until 2010.
A major goal in Japan’s utilization of nuclear energy is to secure 
reliable energy supplies. Two so-called “absolute premises” identified are 
adherence to the principles of peaceful use only and assurance of safety. A 
number of criteria guide the overall programme. Work is undertaken on the 
basis of promoting nuclear fuel recycling, taking into account Japanese and 
world situations. The programme seeks to establish a consistent system of 
light water nuclear power generation. It is also committed to diversification 
in nuclear technology development as well as the reinforcement of basic 
research capabilities.
Power Generation in Japan
By 1996, 20 percent of Japan’s total power requirements were being 
met with nuclear power. Thermal power at 60 percent and hydro power at 21 
percent provided the remainder. The growth of nuclear power in Japan is 
expected to be strong well into the future. The following table provides the 
projected growth of nuclear power in the country.
Table 1





COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN
To meet the above projections, Japan’s power, station capacity is 
expected to expand from current capacities as described in the table below:
Table 2
Nuclear Power Stations in Japan
Operating 50 Units (42,547 MW)
Under construction 3 Units ( 3,361 MW)
Planning 2 Units ( 1,925 MW)
Candidate 21 Units (27,324 MW)
R&D 2 Units ( 445 MW)
The Japan Atomic power Company has been at the forefront of 
power generation, with its Tokai power station being Japan’s first 
commercial nuclear power plant. Tokai No.2 was Japan’s first large scale 
nuclear power plant. In addition, the Tsuruga station’s unit 1 was Japan’s 
first nuclear power plant with light water reactor technology.
104
SUM M ARY O F ROUNDTABLE ON CO N FID EN C E
BUILDING
This essay is an abridged summary of the discussions on the 
confidence building exercise. The existing global scene presents an ideal 
situation for undertaking confidence building exercises in light of past 
rigidities breaking down with the end of the cold war. Confidence building 
measures (CBMs) constitute building blocks which could provide 
operational substance to the notion of common or cooperative security. 
CBMs may in fact be viewed as techniques for gaining results without war.
CBMs can be classified into two categories, military and 
nonmilitary. The functions of military CBMs relate to communication, 
information, verification, observation and monitoring, stabilization and 
regulation of military arrangements and crisis management. The nonmilitary 
CBMs cover areas such as collaboration in science and technology, free 
movement of people and ideas, and exchange of views and analyses. 
Confidence building through technical cooperation can pave the way for 
dealing uniquely with more intractable political issues or at least diffuse such 
issues. In the current era of global interdependence in which India is 
increasingly getting linked through its economic and technological 
liberalisation and globalisation policies, isolating or punishing a country 
through embargoes is counterproductive and ultimately not sustainable. 
Rather than using technology as a weapon, it could be used to bind nations 
together. CBMs tend to be slow institutional processes that may take 
decades to provide results and the process needs political will, meaningful 
cooperation and patience.
The purpose of the Seminar’s Roundtable was to explore areas where 
mutual cooperation between states would prove fruitful and successful in 
various areas of nuclear technology. Participants offered a range of 
comments, some more directly focused on confidence building than others.
One participant commented on the relevance of nuclear power and 
how to meet India’s growing energy requirements. In this sector, it was felt 
that there is an opportunity for cooperation between India and the U.S., as 
well as other Asian countries in particular. The need to evolve cooperation on 
technological aspects was emphasised. In this connection, this participant 
pointed out that despite certain Indian perceptions regarding U.S. intentions, 
American policies in the technology realm are not just targeted against India. 
It was suggested that the number one target of United States is Japan and that 
the future direction of Japanese defence policy depends on whether and to 
what degree, the political circumstances that currently limit Japanese military 
power change. According to one school of thought, Japan will inevitably
correct the imbalance between its military and economic power. According 
to this participant, it is clear that the use of technology should play an 
important role in strengthening the economy of any nation, and a strong 
plea was made that there should not be any hindrance for any state in 
transfering technologies to other states.
It was the view of another participant that the time had come now to 
form small working groups and discuss five or six key questions and 
discover where the commonalities lie, especially between India and the U.S., 
and see whether the differences can be resolved. This would provide a 
specific way of moving beyond the more general concerns which are 
inevitably raised in the broader settings of seminars or conferences. It was 
argued that after the end of the cold war, a series of changes in both the 
American foreign and military policy decision making system and 
information gathering system have taken place. It was noted that this has 
resulted in an information gap between the more generalist strategic decision 
makers versus regional specialists on Indian strategic thinking, both inside 
and outside the government, which if not somehow corrected, could have an 
adverse impact on actual policies formulated.
One participant called for much more consistency between the 
rhetoric and actions of states. In this connection, it was stressed that the 
intentions of the U.S. regarding its policies toward India in particular, and 
South Asia in general, should be transparent. One impediment to 
collaboration in technology has been the enduring communication gap 
between scientific communities and the policymaking bodies and 
bureaucracies. It was suggested that confidence building should start with 
trying to achieve a common understanding among scientists. Moreover, it 
was urged that the roots of misunderstandings should be explored before 
setting off into an era of mutual cooperation.
One of the participants emphasized the challenge of developing 
nuclear energy safely, which will require cooperation at a global level. 
While technical alternatives to produce nuclear energy without the 
production of weapon grade fissile material need to be pursued further, given 
the vast resources necessary, larger pools of funds have to be made available. 
In this case, the common good which may result needs to be balanced against 
narrower commercial/economic interests.
Another viewpoint presented in the confidence building exercise 
focused on the changing global scenario. It was felt that the time has now 
come to replace old ideas and old relationships with fresh thinking. 
According to this participant, the fact is that India is not on the top of the 
U.S. list of concerns and vice versa. India is neither an enemy nor a major 
concern for the U.S. Moreover, it was felt that it is very difficult to even
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understand a country like India. It was argued that there are a lot of 
contradictions in its policies. For this participant, it is difficult to comprehend 
at times why India, in keeping its own options open which it is free to do, 
feels that plans, efforts and regimes established by other countries to promote 
their security are a threat to India. For example, India made it very clear 
throughout the years that developing countries should have access to nuclear 
technology and that is what Article IV of the NPT is aimed at. But, on the 
other hand, India was against the indefinite extension of the NPT. In 
considering India, it was pointed out that although India was the pioneer of 
the Gandhi Plan, it has now become its opponent. The same is the case with 
the CTBT proposal. The participant posed the question whether it is really in 
India’s interests to have more nuclear weapon states.
During the Roundtable, the participant speaking on the U.S. 
stockpile stewardship and management programme reiterated that it is still a 
work in progress, but suggested that some of the same techniques can be 
applied in India’s case to maintain a very robust nuclear weapon capability 
without recourse to nuclear explosive tests. In this connection, it was pointed 
out that a non NPT state or nuclear threshold state like India would be 
especially concerned about getting four things right in the design of nuclear 
weapons, which were then explained as hydrodynamics, neutronics, timely 
initiation of the fission chain reaction and estimation of yield. For example, 
hydrodynamic behaviour of a device during the assembly phase can be 
predicted by well established computer modeling techniques and confirmed 
experimentally by hydrodynamic testing. The behaviour of implosion 
systems design with fissile Pu-239 or highly enriched uranium cores can be 
investigated at reduced scale to avoid criticality. And finally it was 
suggested that the full scale implosion system designs can be tested with 
non-fissile cores made of U-238 or 80 percent Pu-242.
Another participant pointed out that the subject of nuclear 
cooperation was not just CBMs between India and the U.S. or India and 
other countries, but needs to be seen within the context of the entire gamut 
of nuclear cooperation. It was argued that the gap in perceptions between 
states is wide and real. Moreover, while all countries and political leaders 
use rhetoric, it was felt that a major problem in Indo-U.S. relations is that 
India treats much o f U.S. rhetoric as policy, and the U.S. treats India’s policy 
formulations as rhetoric. To rectify this problem, both countries require 
much greater dialogue and understanding. It was asserted that while cold 
war mindsets have not fully dissipated, the new foreign policy agenda of the 
Clinton administration should be carefully studied.
In connection with the Clinton administration’s ostensible policy of 
capping, reducing and eventually eliminating, nuclear capabilities in South
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Asia, especially targeting India’s missile and nuclear policy, it was argued 
that India will not accept denuclearisation under the rubric of a global or 
regional nonproliferation policy. It was felt that India will maintain its 
nuclear weapon status, either at a “recessed deterrence” level, or if pressures 
to de-nuclearise continue, at a “minimum deterrence” level. The challenges 
for cooperation therefore, should be viewed in this context. The longer it 
takes to establish a dialogue, the more difficult it will be to arrive at 
mutually acceptable arrangements for cooperation.
Further, one participant presented a series of options for building 
nuclear cooperation focused on Indo-U.S. relations. These included more 
open trade and investment in the nuclear power sector which will require 
requisite modifications in export control regimes. As an interim step, a 
strategic arms reduction treaty between India and the five nuclear weapon 
states was proposed to limit the size of arsenals, range and numbers of 
delivery systems.
An additional option, seen as the most difficult to achieve, but likely 
to offer the maximum pay-offs to all was also put forth. This included India 
and the west on the same side of nonproliferation on the assumption that 
India will accept restraints and nonproliferation regimes, while concurrently, 
the U.S.-led west will accept the reality and sustenance of India’s nuclear 
weapon status. A protocol to the NPT could be signed by India which 
commits India to all provisions of the NPT regarding transfer of technology 
and Article VI, and India in return, could be allowed to have access to 
nuclear technology, trade and investments.
According to another participant, a major problem in reaching 
understanding in the nuclear field is the existence of double standards in 
policy making. It was underlined that any agreement reached by persuasion 
only will last. It was suggested that one of the urgent needs regarding 
confidence building in the nuclear field, is to have a no first use commitment 
from all the nuclear weapon powers. This should be the starting point for 
discussions on elimination of nuclear weapons. In moving toward global 
nuclear disarmament, as a practical matter, states have to be convinced of 
the declining utility of nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons states 
retain the right of first use, as many important ones are continuing to do, the 
argument exhorting a country to give up its nuclear option is considerably 
weakened. The participant concluded that no first use, especially in the post 
cold war era, is something around which the international community must 
strive to reach a universal consensus.
108
SU M M A RY O F  SELEC TED  DISCUSSIONS
On the basic question of India’s strategic perspective, there was 
general agreement by the Indian participants that the CTBT debate had 
clarified India’s thinking on the continued need to keep India’s nuclear 
option open. Some participants were of the view that India and the U.S. need 
to shed their tendency for the “normative approach.” For example, the U.S. 
claims that nonproliferation has now become the international norm whereas 
India argues that elimination of all weapons of mass destruction must be the 
norm. This rigid approach is seen as making it difficult to resolve the 
nuclear question.
In this view, India is faced with tough choices similar to what China 
had to go through earlier. Both attempted different sorts of alliances and 
associations but ultimately realised they had to rely on their own means, 
because they were too large to fit into bigger alliances. This leaves out the 
alliance option for sorting out the security balance. It was pointed out that 
China used left wing internationalist super power hegemonism to justify its 
own position. India argues liberal international principles. But significantly, 
China successfully gate crashed into the nuclear club whereas India has been 
indecisive. While the thinking surrounding the CTBT has led to a new 
articulation of “national security,” it has not removed the traditional focus on 
disarmament. Ironically it is India which continuously hovers around the 
threshold status, which invites the full wrath of the global nonproliferation 
regime.
Another Indian perspective was that despite the clarity on national 
security gained through the CTBT debate, India’s past emphasis on 
disarmament has not changed. The reason, according to this participant, is 
that disarmament is in India’s national security interest. Thus India presses 
for disarmament not because it is anti-America or as opposition to someone 
else, but because it is a national security goal. However, there was some 
agreement that Russia and China may not see nuclear disarmament as in their 
national security interest for a long time.
There was some division on the probability of U.S. moves toward 
nuclear abolition, with an American participant presenting an optimistic 
scenario against a much more skeptical Indian interpretation. The participant 
suggested that one of the reasons for Indian skepticism was that the 
conclusions were deductively reached, based on a paradigm of realism 
governing international relations. In response, it was pointed out that in 
empirical terms, the trend did not show any real shift from realism thus far.
Some discussion took place on whether a purely technical solution 
could be found for getting around the proliferation problem. The discussion
began on the use of weapons plutonium for power production. The issue of 
the U.S. obtaining Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU), 
denaturing it and using it in U.S. reactors was raised, especially in the 
context of America holding enormous stockpiles of plutonium which could 
as well be used for this purpose. The point was made that the concern 
regarding reprocessing, lack of enthusiasm in the U.S. for utilising plutonium 
for power production, and political pressures have all dampened the 
developmental efforts of other countries as well. The U.S. expert explained 
that the nonuse of plutonium is based on its poor economics. While molten 
salt reactor (MSR) and fast breeder reactor (FBR) have had successful 
developmental history, their commercialisation history is rather poor. They 
are unlikely to be competitive in the energy market for at least the next Fifty 
years, during which period more and more of weapon plutonium will find 
use as energy source.
Some discussion followed on economics and technology 
development costs and a point was made that earlier technology development 
costs relating to thermal reactors were underwritten by the U.S. defence 
department which made it appear as though the development costs were 
lower. One of the U.S. delegates explained that the U.S. gave up FBR 
development after spending approximately 12 billion dollars and that it was 
no small amount. In response the Indian delegate pointed out that the U.S. 
views on plutonium will be coloured by its own national interest and 
perceptions. For India which has no access to presently cheap (global) 
uranium market, and limited uranium resources, but abundant thorium, there 
is an absolute need to reprocess and push ahead with breeder programmes. 
Certain other delegates stressed the need to increase the nuclear share in 
energy production, especially in the context of growing environmental 
concerns.
In this connection, one area which generated much discussion related 
to nuclear energy development, especially lessons from the South Korean 
experience. Several questions were raised on the South Korean programme 
regarding fuel cycle time, spent fuel storage, costs, and dependence on fuel 
from outside sources, particularly with reference to the security of supply. 
The South Korean respondent noted that while they would like to establish 
total fuel cycle capability and also close the fuel cycle, they are unable to do 
so due to perhaps political considerations. Currently, they do not have 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities. They import fuel and store the spent 
fuel at the station sites. Some details of the programme were also given 
including the capital cost per KW (1800 U.S. dollars); the unit energy cost 
per KWH (3 cents); the fueling interval (15 to 18 months); and refueling 
outage time (30 to 45 days).
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Discussion followed on the growth of nucteai power uv South Korea 
and possible effects from the slowing down of growth from the year 2000. A  
comparison was made to France where huge investments in infrastructure 
and manufacturing facilities built for a large programme could not be 
effectively utilized after the country achieved the target of over 80 percent, 
at the same time that there was a slowing down of nuclear power 
programmes globally. In response, it was pointed out that there are several 
countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, North Korea and Indonesia in the 
region which needed power and an effort could be made to establish 
collaboration, with India also participating. One of the Indian delegates felt 
that under the pretext of proliferation, development and cooperation in the 
area of nuclear power is being curbed in Southeast Asia. On the question of 
the use of irradiated fuel from light water reactor as a feed in heavy water 
reactors, the Korean respondent noted that discussions are still on with the 
U.S. and Canada but that details are unavailable.
Regarding why South Korea chose two different reactor types i.e. 
pressurised water reactor (PWR) and pressurised heavy water reactor 
(PHWR), the response was that despite capital and unit energy costs of 
PHWRs being higher, the source and conditions of funding and political 
considerations (involving U.S., U.K., Canada) could have been responsible 
for deciding on the type of reactors. On the subject of South Korea 
providing nuclear reactors to North Korea, some participants were critical of 
the policy of rewarding a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty violator which 
will send the wrong signal. One of the U.S. participants explained that the 
deal struck was in the interest of North Korea giving up its reprocessing plan, 
and hence achieving a broader nonproliferation objective.
Turning to the Indian programme, discussion focused on long term 
planning, the reasons for slow progress, safety, the three stage programme 
starting with PHWR and fast breeder and thorium utilisation. The Indian 
expert explained in detail the reasons for the slow progress, the great 
emphasis on the safety culture, and development of advanced heavy water 
reactors. There were comments on the plant load factor (PLF) being on the 
lower side. In response, data was provided to indicate good improvements in 
the PLF over the past few years which has resulted in life time capacity 
factors touching around 60 percent. The reasons for PLF being lower in 
comparison to the world average was also explained. It was categorically 
stated that the problems are more related to conventional areas, but also that 
given the need to totally indigenise nuclear power production, this is the 
price one has to pay for such efforts. The benefits that accrue in terms of 
upgrading indigenous technologies and quality were also pointed out. Some 
discussion also took place on the Indian energy policy, the tariff structure, 
privatisation and the need for government to fund nuclear power.
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